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GENDERLESS MARRIAGE, 
INSTITUTIONAL REALITIES, AND 
JUDICIAL ELISION 
MONTE NEIL STEWART* 
elision, noun  . . . . The act or an instance of omitting something.1 
elide, verb . . . .  To eliminate or leave out of consideration.2 
Premised on the uncontroversial notion that marriage is a social 
institution and then informed by social institutional studies, the social 
institutional argument for man/woman marriage is a sufficient 
response to the variety of constitutional challenges leveled at the laws 
sustaining that institution. That is so because of what the argument 
succeeds in demonstrating.  It demonstrates that marriage, like all 
social institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings; 
that these meanings teach, form, and transform individuals; and that 
in this way, these meanings provide vital social goods (which are 
described).  The argument further demonstrates that, with its power to 
suppress social meanings, the law can radically change and even 
deinstitutionalize man/woman marriage, with concomitant loss of the 
institution’s social goods; that genderless marriage is a radically 
different institution than man/woman marriage, as evidenced by the 
 
Copyright © 2006 Monte Neil Stewart and Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy. 
 * This Article is available on-line at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp and at 
http://www.manwomanmarriage.org.   This Article considers developments through December 8, 
2005. 
 1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). 
 2. Id. 
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large divergence in the nature of their respective social goods; and that 
society can have at any time only one of those two institutions 
denominated marriage.  Finally, the argument demonstrates that, 
although the law is potent to replace the man/woman marriage 
institution with the genderless marriage institution, it is powerless to 
allow same-sex couples into the privileged marriage institution we 
have always known; and that law-mandated genderless marriage will 
sweep in not only all couples who marry in the future but the 
man/woman couples who married into the old institution. 
With its demonstration that the legal redefinition of marriage will 
in time (and probably sooner than later) result in the loss of the vital 
social goods uniquely provided by the man/woman marriage 
institution, the social institutional argument is thus an argument that 
society (and hence government) has a compelling interest in continuing 
to sustain that institution of betterment. 
Yet to date, the courts mandating genderless marriage have chosen 
(consciously it appears) to elide rather than engage the argument.  
After making the social institutional argument, this Article examines 
in detail the elision phenomenon, as seen in such cases as Goodridge 
from Massachusetts, Halpern from Ontario, and EGALE from British 
Columbia. In this way, the Article identifies a number of manners of 
elision; it then critiques the judicial performance relative to each.  
Finally, the Article, anticipating that courts will eventually address 
them, evaluates two counter-arguments that engage to some extent the 
realities advanced by the social institutional argument. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
he stuff of the marriage debate is not static.  That is particularly 
true in the courts, where the legal definition of marriage is 
debated most thoroughly and most consequentially.  Since 1971, 
when a same-sex couple first advanced the claim that constitutional 
guarantees mandated the redefinition of marriage from the union of 
a man and a woman to the union of any two persons,3 each side’s 
bundle of arguments has changed and is still changing.  Much of the 
 
 3. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
T 
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change entails a refinement of arguments, a wholly understandable 
phenomenon in a judicial/political engagement hard fought for many 
years now.4  But an important part of that change is the dropping and 
adding of entire arguments. 
The dropping is invariably in response to a pattern of judicial 
rejection.  Examples include the “definitional preclusion,” “natural 
limits,” and “marriage as supra-legal construct” arguments, each of 
which urged in its distinctive way that something essential to 
marriage precludes alteration by the law.  In a triumph for the 
undiluted positivist view of law, the courts generally rejected these 
arguments, and consequently the proponents of man/woman 
marriage no longer use them.5 Likewise, the proponents of genderless 
marriage6 have largely abandoned, after judicial rejection, the 
 
 4. The judicial/political engagement began in earnest with the decision of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  For a descriptive overview of that 
engagement in the United States, see William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage:  
Equality and Social Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004); in Canada, see F.C. DeCoste, The 
Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 
ALBERTA L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2003), and Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-sex Marriage 
in Canada and the United States:  Controversy over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social 
Institution (2005) (paper presented at the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment Symposium, 
Brigham Young University, Sep. 9, 2005), available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/marriage_family/ 
Sept9conference/draft%20papers/NBalaSame%20Sex%20Marr%20Can%20USA%202005drft.pdf 
(soon to be published in the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law); and in South 
Africa, see J.A. Robinson, The Evolution of the Concept of Marriage in South Africa:  The 
Influence of the Bill of Rights (2005) (paper presented at the 12th World Conference of the 
International Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, July 19–23 2005). 
 5. Instead of denying the power of the law to radically alter a core constitutive meaning of 
marriage, proponents now focus instead on the wisdom of so using the law. 
 6. A word about terminology:  Rather than use the more common phrase same-sex 
marriage or gay marriage, this article uses the phrase genderless marriage to refer to the form of 
civil marriage legally defined as the union of any two persons.  The phrase same-sex marriage is 
subtly misleading; although the legal definition of civil marriage as the union of any two persons 
allows same-sex couples to marry, it of course also allows a woman and a man to marry, and 
everywhere the debate focuses on one legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two.  
The phrase same-sex marriage thus conveys the sense (erroneous) of a legally recognized marriage 
separate or different from the marriage of a man and a woman.  This article refers to civil 
marriage defined as the union of a man and a woman as man/woman marriage. 
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argument premised on the federal constitution’s eighth amendment 
that precluding same-sex couples from marrying constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment.7 
Proponents have also added new arguments that were not 
effectively or centrally a part of the earlier debate.  There is now the 
“conservative” argument for genderless marriage, focusing on the 
beneficial effects entry into marriage may have on gay men.8  On the 
man/woman marriage side, new arguments arise from institutional 
studies9 and from critical review of genderless marriage proponents’ 
use of personal relationship theory.10 
This Article addresses one of the new arguments advanced in 
support of man/woman marriage and now drawing judicial 
 
Genderless is used instead of non-gendered and man/woman instead of gendered because, as a 
matter of contemporary language usage, to use the words gendered and non-gendered could be 
seen as an endorsement of certain versions of social constructionist thought.  Although those 
versions may be valid, this article stands neutral on the validity question for reasons made clear 
elsewhere.  See Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 35–
36, 71, 75–85 (2004), available at  http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/jrm.pdf, 
[hereinafter Stewart]. 
 7. E.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973). 
 8. E.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); Andrew Sullivan, 
The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 76. 
Maggie Gallagher suggests “that the arguments in favor of gay marriage, developed over the 
last thirty years, have largely stopped developing.  These arguments have had a powerful impact 
on public opinion, particularly legal elites, over the same period.  But to these now well-worn 
arguments, little new has been added in recent months or even years.”  Maggie Gallagher, (How) 
Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. 
ST. THOMAS L. J. 33, 34 (2004). 
 9. E.g., Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and 
Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 560–67, 589–95, [hereinafter Stewart & Duncan] available at 
http://manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/Marriage_Betrayal_of_Perez.pdf; Stewart, supra note 6; 
Daniel Cere, War of the Ring,  in DIVORCING MARRIAGE:  UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S 
NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9, 15 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE]. 
 10. E.g., DANIEL CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW:  LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN 
NORTH AMERICA (Council on Family Law, 2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/ 
pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf; Stewart, supra note 6, at 85–86, 95–99. 
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attention, the argument from social institutional studies.11  This 
argument teaches that the social institution of marriage, like all 
institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings; that 
these meanings teach, form, and transform individuals; and that in 
this way, these meanings provide vital social goods.  The argument 
further demonstrates that with its power to suppress social meanings, 
the law can radically change and even deinstitutionalize man/woman 
marriage, with concomitant loss of the institution’s social goods; that 
genderless marriage is a radically different institution than 
man/woman marriage, as evidenced by the large divergence in the 
nature of their respective social goods; that society can have at any 
time only one of those two institutions denominated marriage; that 
although the law is potent to replace the man/woman marriage 
institution with the genderless marriage institution, it is powerless to 
allow same-sex couples into the privileged marriage institution we 
have always known; and that law-mandated genderless marriage will 
sweep in not only same-sex couples, and not only all couples who 
marry in the future, but the man/woman couples who married into 
the old institution.  With its demonstration that the legal redefinition 
of marriage will in time and probably sooner than later result in the 
loss of the vital social goods uniquely provided by the man/woman 
marriage institution, the social institutional argument is thus an 
argument that society (and hence government) has a compelling 
interest in continuing to sustain that institution of betterment. In this 
way, the social institutional argument is a sufficient answer to the 
variety of constitutional challenges leveled against man/woman 
marriage. Yet to date, the courts holding for genderless marriage 
 
 11. See infra Part III; see also Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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have chosen (consciously it appears) to elide rather than engage the 
argument. 
This Article sets forth the social institutional argument in some 
detail in Part II, then examines in Part III the phenomenon of 
judicial elision of the argument. Part IV, anticipating that courts will 
eventually address them, evaluates two counter-arguments that 
engage to some extent the realities advanced by the social 
institutional argument. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II 
MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 
Marriage is a social institution,12 and, accordingly, what can be 
said accurately about all social institutions can be said accurately of 
the institution of marriage.  Social institutional studies provide a 
wealth of explanation regarding social institutions: what constitutes 
them, how they provide various social goods, how they educate, 
form, and transform individuals, how society (especially through the 
law) reinforces, alters, or destroys (deinstitutionalizes) these 
institutions, and how such changes affect individuals and society. 
Before setting forth those understandings and applying them to 
the legal definition of marriage, however, I relate a simple human 
experience that shows the real-life workings of the concepts that 
follow. 
A.  Olympic Skaters and Brown Loafers 
After winning a spot on the American team headed to the 1960 
Olympic Winter Games in Squaw Valley, California, eighteen-year-
 
 12. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“[T]he marriage relation [is] 
an institution more basic in our civilization than any other.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (“Marriage is a vital social institution.”). 
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old speed skater Barbara Lockhart decided to learn Russian.13  At that 
time, the Soviet Union’s speed skaters were the best in the world, and 
Barbara wanted to become acquainted with them and even establish 
some friendships.  She succeeded.  Klara Guseva, who won the gold 
medal in the 1,000 meter race, and Barbara spent a fair amount of 
time together at Squaw Valley and became friends. 
Near the end of the Games, Barbara and two American 
teammates were visiting in their Olympic Village dorm room.  Klara 
entered, removed the slippers she was wearing, and began trying on 
the American athletes’ shoes.  She seemed particularly pleased with a 
pair of brown loafers.  With the loafers on her feet, Klara walked out.  
The Americans watched dumbfounded.  Klara kept the shoes for her 
own use, and the flummoxed Americans never could bring 
themselves to seek the shoes’ return. 
The profound differences in Barbara’s and Klara’s respective 
conducts regarding the brown loafers, and indeed their respective 
self-identities in that context, are readily explained by 
understandings of social institutions.  I turn to those understandings 
now. 
B.  Understandings from Institutional Studies 
One of the most important understandings is that social 
institutions are constituted in large measure by shared public 
meanings. Although in pedestrian use the word “institution” may 
conjure up an image of an edifice constructed of steel, concrete, and 
glass, a social institution is not that.  Rather, it is “constituted by 
 
 13. Barbara Lockhart related this experience orally to the author in September, 2005, and 
then reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of the written account appearing in the text.  Dr. 
Lockhart has been a professor of exercise science at Temple University, the University of Iowa, 
and Brigham Young University. 
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complex webs of social meaning.”14 John Searle explains this social 
reality using the example of another social institution, money: 
[W]e can say, for example, in order that the concept “money” 
apply to the stuff in my pocket, it has to be the sort of thing that 
people think is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it 
ceases to function as money, and eventually ceases to be money. . 
. . [I]n order that a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in 
order that it should fall under the concept of money, it must be 
believed to be, or used as, or regarded as, etc., satisfying the 
definition. . . . And what goes for money goes for elections, 
private property, wars, voting, promises, marriages, buying and 
selling, political offices, and so on.15 
The shared meanings—both formal and informal—that 
constitute a social institution interact and are interdependent; each 
meaning affects and is dependent on all the others.16 
Social institutions shape and guide individuals’ identities, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct. An institution “supplies to the 
people who participate in it what they should aim for, dictates what is 
acceptable or effective for them to do, and teaches how they must 
relate to other members of the institution and to those on the 
outside.”17 This profound influence ought not to be underestimated; 
institutions “shape[] what those who participate in [them] think of  
 
 
 
 14. Stewart, supra note 6, at 83.  An important foundational work in contemporary social 
institutional theory is MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986). 
 15. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 32 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 16. Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social 
Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 19 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee 
eds., 1998) (“An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and informal—governing 
social relationships.”). 
 17. Stewart, supra note 6, at 111. 
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themselves and of one another, what they believe to be important, 
and what they strive to achieve.”18 Thus, 
an institution guides and sustains individual identity in the same 
way as a family, forming individuals by enabling or disabling 
certain ways of behaving and relating to others, so that each 
individual’s possibilities depend on the opportunities opened up 
within the institution to which the person belongs.19 
But inasmuch as human societies create and sustain social 
institutions, a society can change its social institutions. “Institutions 
can be changed in the sense that they will necessarily change if 
sufficiently many individuals try to change them.”20 And because 
social institutions are constituted by shared public meanings, they 
are necessarily changed when those meanings are changed or no 
longer sufficiently shared. Indeed, that is the only way a social 
institution can be changed. 
An individual may withdraw his deposit from a bank, or 
break the law, or the rules [of] a game, without causing the 
change or collapse of the institutions concerned. Such an action 
would not be possible for all individuals acting as a collective 
[without causing that change or collapse]. Conversely, there are 
acts which are possible only for all individuals, but not for any 
single individual. Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying 
institutions are examples of this.21 
Just as social institutions can be changed by alteration of the 
constitutive shared public meanings, so they can be renewed and 
strengthened by use consistent with those shared public meanings. 
Whereas frequent use wears out most things—a car or a shirt, for 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. HELEN REECE, DIVORCING RESPONSIBLY 185 (2003). 
 20. EERIK LAGERSPETZ, THE OPPOSITE MIRRORS: AN ESSAY ON THE CONVENTIONALIST 
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 28 (1995). 
 21. Eerik Lagerspetz, On the Existence of Institutions, in ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REALITY 70, 82 (Eerik Lagerspetz et al. eds., 2001). 
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example—frequent use actually renews and strengthens social 
institutions.22 And just as social institutions can be changed or 
reinforced, social institutions can be entirely dismantled when 
members of the community fail to recognize or share their core 
constitutive meanings.23 
Society can use the law effectively to reinforce, to alter, or to 
dismantle a social institution. This is because the law has an 
expressive or educative function that is magnified by its authoritative 
voice.24 And in actual practice, the law’s authoritative voice is used to 
reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the shared public meanings that 
constitute a social institution.25 
 
 22. SEARLE, supra note 15, at 57. 
[A]s several social theorists have pointed out, institutions are not worn out by 
continued use, but each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution. 
Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use renews and strengthens 
institutions such as marriage, property, and universities. . . . [I]n terms of the continued 
collective intentionality of the users, each use of the institution is a renewed expression 
of the commitment of the users to the institution.  
Id. 
 23. Id. at 117. 
The secret of understanding the continued existence of institutional facts is simply 
that the individuals directly involved and a sufficient number of members of the 
relevant community must continue to recognize and accept the existence of such facts. . 
. . The moment, for example, that all or most of the members of a society refuse to 
acknowledge [the social institution of] property rights, as in a revolution or other 
upheaval, property rights cease to exist in that society. 
Id. 
 24. E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986) (“Supporting valuable forms 
of life is a social rather than an individual matter. Monogamy, assuming that it is the only morally 
valuable form of marriage, cannot be practised by an individual. It requires a culture which 
recognizes it, and which supports it through the public’s attitude and through its formal 
institutions.”); Gallagher, supra note 8, at 51 (“Laws do more than incentivize or punish ….  They 
educate directly and indirectly.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 69–71 (1996); Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 
138 (S. Afr. Const. Ct  Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ 
uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT60-04) (“The law is . . . a great teacher [and] establishes public 
norms . . . .”). 
 25. Regarding the reinforcing function, Joseph Raz observes: 
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Use of the law to reinforce, alter, or extinguish the shared public 
meanings that constitute a social institution is a political act. As 
Edward Schiappa notes, “Definitions put into practice a special sort 
of social knowledge—a shared understanding among people about 
themselves, the objects of their world, and how they ought to use 
language.”26 He continues: 
If we look hard enough, all definitions serve some sort of 
interests. . . . Defining what is or is not part of our shared reality 
is a profoundly political act. The establishment of authoritative 
definitions by law or custom requires a political process involving 
persuasion or force that generates political results by advancing 
some views and interests and not others.27 
Schiappa’s reference to “a shared understanding among people 
about . . . the objects of their world” illuminates the important 
distinction between a social institution and the objects or 
arrangements to which the institution relates most directly or 
intimately.  They are not the same, although casual thought may 
mistake the latter for the former.  A dollar bill is commonly referred 
to as money, but it is not the social institution of money.  Likewise, a 
 
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social institutions which enjoy 
unanimous support in the community, in order to give them formal recognition, bring 
legal and administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use by 
members of the community who wish to do so, and encourage the transmission of belief 
in their value to future generations. In many countries this is the significance of the 
legal recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of polygamy. 
RAZ, supra note 24, at 161. 
 26. EDWARD SCHIAPPA, DEFINING REALITY: DEFINITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 3 
(2003). 
 27. Id. at 69–70 (citation omitted).  Kitzinger and Wilkinson apply the reality articulated by 
Schiappa to the marriage context: 
Marriage is a lynchpin of social organization:  its laws and customs interface with 
almost every sphere of social interaction.  Its foundational role in defining structures of 
social institution and citizenship means that definitional authority over what ‘counts’ as 
marriage, and who is allowed access to it, has always been intensely political. 
Celia Kitzinger & Sue Wilkinson, The Re-Branding of Marriage: Why We Got Married Instead of 
Registering a Civil Partnership, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 127, 132 (2004). 
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wheat farm or a phosphate mine or a marshmallow factory, although 
reflexively thought of in our society as private property, is not the 
institution of private property.  The dollar bill and the marshmallow 
factory are only objects about which we may share understandings, 
meanings, and norms—depending on the social institutions in our 
particular society. 
If the law affecting a social institution is “constitutional law,” 
meaning the most fundamental law of the polity, the suppression of 
old meanings and/or replacement with radically different meanings 
operates across the entire public square.  And it would seem that the 
more totalitarian the government, the more extensive the public 
square and therefore the more influential or even invasive the 
constitutional law in whatever remains of the private.  Here is an 
example of “deinstitutionalization” by constitutional law; it is the 
first Soviet constitution’s treatment of private property: 
Pursuant to the socialization of land, private land ownership 
is hereby abolished, and all land is proclaimed the property of the 
entire people and turned over to the working people without any 
redemption, on the principles of egalitarian land tenure. All 
forests, mineral wealth and waters of national importance, as well 
as all live and dead stock, model estates and agricultural 
enterprises are proclaimed the property of the nation . . . [as well 
as] the complete conversion of factories, mines, railways and 
other means of production and transportation into the property 
of the Soviet Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic.28 
Finally, from these understandings of social institutions there 
necessarily follows this: To alter a social institution by altering the 
shared public meanings that constitute it is to also alter the 
individual identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct formed by 
reference to the old institution. The greater the alteration to the 
 
 28. KONSTITUTSIIA RSFSR (1918) [Konst. RSFSR] [RSFSR Constitution] art. 3, available at 
http://www.politicsforum.org/documents/constitution_rsfsr_1918.php. 
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institution, the greater the changes in the individual. Likewise, the 
more influential the social institution changed, the greater the 
changes in the individual.29 
With these understandings, I return to the story of the Olympic 
skaters and the brown loafers.  Clearly, Barbara and Klara had 
radically different relationships to and understandings of the same 
pair of brown loafers.  Barbara had been taught, formed, and 
transformed by her society’s strong social institution of private 
property, an institution reinforced by law and even enshrined in 
American constitutional law,30  while Klara’s society had no 
equivalent private property institution but rather another institution 
that, in radically different ways, taught, formed, and transformed 
individuals in relation to such things as marshmallow factories, 
wheat farms, and shoes, with, again, Soviet law and constitution 
reinforcing that different institution.31 
The American private property institution formed an important 
part of Barbara’s identity, or, more accurately, identities; she 
understood herself to be an “owner” relative to some objects and “not 
an owner” relative to other objects.  Since her early childhood, the 
institution taught her the complex web of meanings, relationships, 
projects, and conducts comprising those two interrelated identities.  
Likewise, the Soviet property institution had, equally effectively, 
formed Klara’s identities and hence her conducts relative both to 
various objects and to the various users of those objects.  Except 
perhaps in an abstract fashion, Barbara’s “property ways” were 
incomprehensible to Klara and to Klara’s parents—but not to her 
 
 29. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 24, at 392. 
 30. E.g., U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
 31. Not until 1977 was there any Soviet constitutional reference to something akin to 
“private property.”  Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] ch. II, art. 13. 
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grandparents, for they would have been taught and formed by an 
effective social institution of private property.  The startled reaction 
of the American athletes that day in that Olympic Village dorm room 
evidences that they had a similar incomprehension of Klara’s 
“property ways.” 
On the foundation of these understandings from social 
institutional studies, I now turn to the social institutional realities 
pertaining to the legal definition of marriage.  It is those institutional 
realities that constitute the social institutional argument to preserve 
man/woman marriage, and an antecedent understanding of that 
argument is simply required to grasp adequately how the courts have 
performed relative to it.  So, although the story of how the courts 
have handled the social institutional argument is extraordinarily 
interesting, spinach before dessert. 
C.  Institutional Studies and the Legal Definition of Marriage 
Almost universally, an important shared public meaning is that 
marriage is the union of a man and a woman.32 Thus, that meaning 
has been a constitutive core of the institution. That core meaning has 
been and continues to be influential in forming individual identity, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct in a way and to an extent that 
common sense readily comprehends.  Any word-picture of that 
influence seems doomed to incompleteness, but here is Daniel Cere’s 
concise effort: 
[M]arriage is an institution that interacts with a unique social-
sexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide. It 
negotiates a stable partnership of life and property. It seeks to 
manage the procreative process and to establish parental 
obligations to offspring. It supports the birthright of children to 
be connected to their mothers and fathers. 
 
 32. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 45–46. 
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. . . . 
Michael Foucault contends that marriage has fostered a 
particular type of human identity, namely, the “conjugal self.” Be 
that as it may, marriage has always been the central cultural site 
of male-female relations. A rich history and a complex heritage of 
symbols, myths, theologies, traditions, poetry, and art have been 
generated by the institution of marriage, which encodes a unique 
set of aspirations into human culture along the axis of permanent 
opposite-sex bonding and parent-child connectedness.33 
As Cere’s description suggests, man/woman marriage is deemed 
to provide well, and even uniquely, a number of social goods.  
Neither claiming completeness nor suggesting any significance to the 
order of appearance, the following subsection sets forth six of those 
valuable social goods gleaned from the literature and particularly 
relevant in the context of the current marriage debate.  The six social 
goods set forth are particularly relevant exactly because the 
institution’s man/woman meaning plays at least a powerful and 
usually an indispensable role in producing them. 
1. Six Social Goods Provided by Man/Woman Marriage 
First, the institution of man/woman marriage is quite certainly 
society’s best and probably its only effective means to make 
meaningful a child’s right to know and be brought up by his or her 
biological parents (with exceptions being justified only in the best 
interests of the child, not those of any adult).34  I take this to be what 
Cere had in mind when he said: “[Man/woman marriage] supports 
the birthright of children to be connected to their mothers and 
fathers.” 
 
 33. Cere, supra note 9 at 11, 14 (footnote omitted). 
 34. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9, 
at 67. 
01__STEWART.DOC 11/1/2007  3:33:44 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 17 ? 
Second, the institution almost certainly qualifies as the most 
effective means humankind has developed so far to maximize the 
level of private welfare provided to the children conceived by 
passionate, heterosexual coupling.35  Indeed, the provision of this 
social good has been called “society’s deep logic of marriage.”36  Two 
essential realities of man/woman intercourse are its procreative 
power and its passion.37  Society’s interest relative to those realities is 
in assuring the provision of adequate private welfare to children.38  
Child-bearing in a setting of inadequate private welfare corrodes 
societal interests while child-bearing in a setting of adequate private 
welfare actually advances those interests.39  In passion-based 
procreation, it is passion rather than rationality that may dictate the 
terms of the procreative encounter.40  Rationality considers 
consequences nine months hence, including the rearing of a child, 
but passion does not.41 Confining procreative passion to a social 
institution that will assure—to the largest practical extent—that 
passion’s consequences (children) begin and continue life with 
adequate private welfare is thus a fundamental and originating 
purpose of marriage.42  The immediate beneficiaries of this private 
 
 35. Stewart, supra note 6, at 48. 
 36. Id at 44. 
 37. Regarding the prevalence of unintended pregnancy even in the contraceptive culture of 
developed countries, see Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage 
and Legal Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 447, 454–56 (2004). 
 38. As used here, the phrase private welfare includes not just the provision of physical needs 
such as food, clothing, and shelter; it encompasses opportunities such as education, play, work, 
and discipline and intangibles such as love, respect, and security. 
 39. Stewart, supra note 6, at 45. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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welfare purpose are the child and the often vulnerable mother, but 
society rationally sees itself as the ultimate beneficiary.43 
The third social good is related to the second.  Man/woman 
marriage is the irreplaceable foundation of the child-rearing mode—
that is, married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways 
not subject to reasonable dispute)44 with the optimal outcomes 
deemed crucial for a child’s—and hence society’s—well being. These 
outcomes include physical, mental, and emotional health and 
development; academic performance and levels of attainment; and 
avoidance of crime and other forms of self- and other-destructive 
behavior such as drug abuse and high-risk sexual conduct.45 
Fourth, man/woman marriage serves as an effective bridge over 
the male-female divide. “[M]arriage has always been the central 
cultural site of male-female relations”46 and society’s primary and 
 
 43. Id.  See also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting) (articulating these understandings particularly well). 
 44. As Justice Sosman said in her dissenting opinion in Goodridge: 
[S]tudies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences between children 
raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples. Interpretation 
of the data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the personal and political 
beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the differences identified are positive or 
negative, and as to the untested explanations of what might account for those 
differences. (This is hardly the first time in history that the ostensible steel of the 
scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense heat of political and 
religious passions.) . . . [T]he most neutral and strict application of scientific principles 
to this field would be constrained by the limited period of observation that has been 
available. . . . The Legislature can rationally view the state of the scientific evidence as 
unsettled on the critical question it now faces: Are families headed by same-sex parents 
equally successful in rearing children from infancy to adulthood as families headed by 
parents of opposite sexes? 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979–80 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
Regarding married mother/father as the optimal child-rearing mode when compared with all 
other adequately studied modes, see Maggie Gallagher and Joshua K. Baker, Do Moms and Dads 
Matter? Evidence from the Social Sciences on Family Structure and the Best Interests of the Child, 4 
MARGINS L. REV. 161 (2004) (collecting references to and summarizing the literature). 
 45. Stewart, supra note 6, at 64–70; Gallagher, supra note 8, at 50–51. 
 46. Cere, supra note 9, at 14. 
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most effective means of bridging the male-female divide—that 
“massive cultural effort of every human society at all times and in all 
places.”47 
Fifth, man/woman marriage is the only institution that can confer 
the status of husband and wife, that can transform a male into a 
husband or a female into a wife (a social identity quite different from 
“partner”),48 and thus that can transform males into husband/fathers 
(a category of males particularly beneficial to society)49 and females 
into wife/mothers (likewise a socially beneficial category).50 
Sixth, legally recognized and privileged man/woman marriage 
constitutes both social and official endorsement of that form of adult 
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may 
rationally value above all other such forms.  That rationality has been 
demonstrated elsewhere,51 and to date there has been no counter to 
that demonstration.  Nor is there any sound basis for a constitutional 
challenge to a societal judgment valuing and on that basis privileging 
one form of adult intimacy above all others, although many 
uncritically assume that Lawrence52 prohibits society from making 
such a judgment.  One or more of the many possible readings of 
Lawrence may well prohibit government from burdening a particular 
form of adult intimacy on no basis other than conventional morality, 
but no responsible reading to date takes Lawrence so far as to 
prohibit a government, acting on the basis of demonstrable 
 
 47. Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING 
MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 43. 
 48. See, e.g., DeCoste, supra note 4, at 625–26. 
 49. See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 139–88 (1996). 
 50. See, e.g., Gallagher & Baker, supra note 44. 
 51. Stewart, supra note 6, at 52–57; Gallagher, supra note 37. 
 52. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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rationality, from most highly valuing and on that basis privileging 
married heterosexual intercourse. 
2. Why Genderless Marriage Cannot Deliver the Same Social 
Goods 
A social institution defined at its core as the union of any two 
persons is unmistakably different from the historic marriage 
institution between a man and a woman.53 
Much has been and can be said about public meanings 
influencing, [or] constituting, social institutions, which in turn 
influence, even define, the human participants. All of that can be 
said, of course, about both man/woman marriage as an institution 
and genderless marriage as an institution. The point is the high 
likelihood that an institution defined at its core as the union of a 
man and a woman (with all that limitation implies and entails 
regarding purposes and activities) will intend and sustain “the 
social understandings, the practices, the goods, and the social 
selves” in large measure not intended or sustained by an 
institution defined at its core as any two persons in a close 
personal relationship.54 
The difference in constitutive meanings of necessity means that 
what the new institution teaches relative to individual identity, 
 
 53. Observers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed regarding the realities of 
social institutions uniformly acknowledge the magnitude of these differences between the two 
possible institutions of marriage. This is so regardless of the observer’s own sexual, political, or 
theoretical orientation or preference. See, e.g., LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES AND PLEASURES: 
FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 125 (1999); RAZ, supra note 24, at 393; 
Cere, supra note 9, at 11–18; Douglas Farrow, Canada’s Romantic Mistake, in DIVORCING 
MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 1–5; Young & Nathanson, supra note 47, at 48–56; Gallagher, supra 
note 8, at 53 (“Many thoughtful supporters of same-sex marriage recognize that some profound 
shift in our whole understanding of the world is wrapped up in this legal re-engineering of the 
meaning of marriage.”); Angela Bolt, Do Wedding Dresses Come in Lavender?  The Prospects and 
Implications of Same-Sex Marriage, 24 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 111, 114 (1998); Andrew 
Sullivan, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 13, 15, 17–18 (1996); Nan D. 
Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY:  REV. LESBIAN & 
GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 12–19 (1991); E.J. Graff, Retying the Knot, 262 THE NATION 12 (June 24, 
1996) (“The right wing gets it:  Same-sex marriage is a breathtakingly subversive idea. . . . 
Marriage is an institution that towers on our social horizon, defining how we think about one 
another  . . . . [S]ame-sex marriage . . . announces that marriage has changed shape.”). 
 54. Stewart, supra note 6, at 77 (footnote omitted). 
01__STEWART.DOC 11/1/2007  3:33:44 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 21 ? 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct is substantially different from 
the formative instruction of the current institution of man/woman 
marriage. That does not mean, of course, that there is no overlap in 
formative instruction; the significance is in the divergence. One 
important divergence centers on the normativeness of married 
heterosexual relations and the normative exceptionality of all other 
forms of intimate human conduct.55 Another centers on the relative 
pre-eminence or subordination of the interests and desires of adults, 
on one hand, and of the interests and needs of children, on the other 
hand.56 
That last point leads to a further evidence of the radical difference 
between the two possible marriage institutions, and that is the 
profound difference in social goods provided.  For example, as noted 
man/woman marriage makes meaningful a child’s right to know and 
be reared by his or her biological parents (with exceptions being 
justified only in the best interests of the child, not those of any adult), 
hereafter referred to in shorthand as the child’s bonding right.  
Governmental selection of genderless marriage in the place of 
man/woman marriage, and especially a constitutional mandate for 
such, further withdraws official recognition of the child’s bonding 
 
 55. See Gallagher, supra note 37, at 448–49 (quoting Martha A. Fineman, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230 (1995)). 
 56. See Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436 at *7 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (“Marriage laws are not primarily about adult needs for official recognition and 
support, but about the well-being of children . . . .”), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ 
reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm; Somerville, supra note 34, at 66–67, 78; Seana Sugrue, 
“Marriage: Inside and Out” at 14–15 (2005) (paper presented at Illuminating Marriage 
Conference, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, May 18-20  2005 (“Hence, same-sex marriage as well as 
a number of other marital reforms, . . . foster the vulnerability of children to advance the desires 
of adults.”); Jane Adolphe, “The Same-Sex Marriage Debate in Canada:  Promoting Adults and 
Ignoring Children,” (2005) (paper presented at the 12th World Conference of the International 
Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, July 19-23, 2005) abstract available at 
http://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/Abstracts.pdf. 
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right.57  It could not be otherwise for a core part of the argument for 
genderless marriage is that same-sex couples have the power to bring 
donor-conceived children into their family and that both the same-
sex couples and these donor-conceived children are entitled to the 
benefits of civil marriage.  In this way genderless marriage is not just 
neutral towards the child’s bonding right but actually undercuts it, 
while, in contrast, man/woman marriage has always provided 
powerful institutional support to that right.  Margaret Somerville 
explains the radical difference, in this context, between the two 
institutions: 
[A]ccepting same-sex marriage necessarily means accepting that 
the societal institution of marriage is intended primarily for the 
benefit of the partners to the marriage, and only secondarily for 
the children born into it. And it means abolishing the norm that 
children—whatever their sexual orientation later proves to be—
have a prima facie right to know and be reared within their own 
biological family by their mother and father. Carefully restricted, 
governed, and justified exceptions to this norm, such as adoption, 
are essential. But abolishing the norm would have a far-reaching 
impact.58 
Another example pertains to the bridge over the male/female 
divide.  The man/woman marriage institution ascribes a high value 
to that endeavor and provides a host of supports for its 
accomplishment.  With a core meaning of “the union of any two 
persons,” the genderless marriage institution quite simply does 
neither.  Moreover, as Camille Williams has shown, man/woman 
marriage “is the only important social institution in which women 
 
 57. I say “further” because government allowance, albeit regulated, of anonymous donor 
conception began the erosion of the child’s right.  As explained in the text, recognition of 
genderless marriage (especially as a constitutional mandate) would appear to render the right a 
complete nullity. 
 58.  Somerville, supra note 34, at 67. 
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have always been necessary participants.”59  Displacement of that 
institution “may result in future generations with a decreased ability 
or desire for men and women to cooperate in families, and may 
ultimately contribute to a new form of gender hierarchy and a new 
variation of a sex-segregated society.”60  The reason is that 
man/woman marriage produces, indeed is, “the norm for 
cooperation between the sexes.  While marriage patterns and 
practices have varied across cultures and over time, marriage has 
involved both sexes, and by doing so has set a pattern for cooperation 
between the sexes.”61 
The last example given here is the preparation for, conferral of, 
and sustenance in the status of husband or wife, with there being no 
need to belabor the large differences between the two possible 
marriage institutions relative to that social good.62 
This exercise is not meant to suggest that genderless marriage 
may not provide unique and perhaps even valuable social goods.  
Proponents of that institution have predicted that it will, and this 
article takes up that issue later.  The point is that man/woman 
marriage and genderless marriage are radically different social 
 
 59. Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, at 1 (2005) 
(paper presented at the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment Symposium, Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, Sep. 9, 2005) available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/marriage_family/ 
Sept9conference/draft%20papers/williams (soon to be published in the Brigham Young 
University Journal of Public Law.) 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 53. 
One thing same-sex marriage indubitably does is displace certain formerly core 
public understandings about marriage; such as, that it has something to do with 
bringing together male and female, men with women, husbands and wives, mothers 
with fathers.  Husband will no longer point to or imply wife.  Mother no longer implies 
father. 
Id. 
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institutions as demonstrated by their wide divergence relative to 
important social goods. 
3.  One or the Other: The Limit to One Marriage Institution 
Governmental selection of genderless marriage has other 
practical outcomes. For my purposes, perhaps the most important is 
found at the intersection of the law’s authoritative role relative to 
marriage’s meanings, and the unitary nature of the institution. By 
unitary nature, I mean simply that society can sustain one and only 
one marriage institution. Society cannot simultaneously tell people 
(especially children) that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union 
of any two persons and that marriage, in its core meaning, is the 
union of a man and a woman. Given the role of language and 
meaning in constituting and sustaining institutions, two “coexisting” 
social institutions known society-wide as marriage amount to a 
factual impossibility. Law’s authoritative role relative to marriage’s 
meaning refers to this: Once the law (on constitutional grounds no 
less) has taken a stand that the core meaning is the union of any two 
persons, the law will then be unrelenting and thoroughgoing in 
enforcement of that decision. The law’s own internal logic and 
institutional mandates require no less. Thus, the intersection of the 
unitary nature of marriage and the law’s authoritative role in 
marriage’s meaning will result in the new meaning being mandated 
in texts, in schools, and in virtually every other part of the public 
square, and being voluntarily published by the media and other 
institutions.63  Even linguistic, social, or religious enclaves dedicated 
to preserving the old meaning will struggle,64 a matter I discuss at 
more length later. 
 
 63. Stewart, supra note 6, at 111. 
 64. Helen Reece explains: 
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One further comment on the unitary nature of the marriage 
institution: Not uncommonly, people confronted with the marriage 
debate think in terms of homosexual marriage, gay marriage or same-
sex marriage as a separate but co-existing marriage institution.  That 
uncritical thinking is no doubt due in part to the misleading power of 
the very phrase same-sex marriage and its equivalents like 
homosexual marriage.  Those phrases are misleading because, 
although the legal definition of civil marriage as the union of any two 
persons allows same-sex couples to marry, it of course also allows a 
woman and a man to marry.  Everywhere the debate focuses on one 
legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two.  The 
phrase same-sex marriage and its equivalents thus convey the sense 
(erroneously) of a legally recognized marriage separate or different 
from the marriage of a man and a woman.65 
 
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm 
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who are 
dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial norm 
community. But this is not a complete solution because the social construction of 
choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem unthinkable or may be too 
costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it may also be merely reactive to 
or even defined by the dominant norm community. 
REECE, supra note 19, at 38. 
 65. Even people who should know better appear to fall into the analytical trap set by the 
misleading terminology.  James Q. Wilson recently said: “Since the Supreme Court struck down 
laws against homosexual conduct many people have been preoccupied with either encouraging or 
resisting homosexual marriage.  Whatever your views about homosexual marriage, were it 
adopted nationally it would affect only about 2 or 3 percent of the population.” James Q. Wilson, 
The Ties That Do Not Bind:  The Decline of Marriage and Loyalty, IN CHARACTER (Fall 2005), 
available at http://www.incharacter.org/article.php?article=46. 
The social institutional reality, of course, is that if “homosexual marriage” (meaning 
genderless marriage, meaning marriage legally and even constitutionally defined as the union of 
any two persons) were “adopted nationally[,] it would affect” not “2 or 3 percent of the 
population” but every married couple and even those in our society not presently married.  See 
infra Part II.C.4–5.  So, Homer nodded. 
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4.  Inclusion and Exclusion: Limits on and Effects of the Law’s 
Power 
Two other and related social institutional realities merit note.  
First, same-sex couples cannot enter the institution of marriage as it 
has existed to the present; in other words, it is not possible in reality 
for same-sex couples to enter the privileged and vital civil institution 
previously enjoyed only by opposite-sex couples.  The very act of 
legal redefinition will radically transform the old institution and 
make it into a profoundly different institution, one whose meanings, 
value, and vitality are speculative.  Some same-sex couples look to the 
law to let them into the privileged institution, and the law may want 
to, but it cannot; it can only give them access to a different institution 
of different value.66 
The second reality applies to already married opposite-sex 
couples.  Redefinition and no act of their own removes them from 
the institution they voluntarily entered (man/woman marriage) into 
a markedly different one.  To the extent that institutions are 
constituted by social meaning, and to the extent that the law dictates 
the social meaning of civil marriage, to redefine marriage as the 
union of any two persons is not to pull gay men and lesbians into 
marriage as our societies now know it but to pull married 
 
 66. Brian Bix, Reflections on the Nature of Marriage, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF 
MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111, 112–13 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002). 
Marriage is an existing social institution.  One might also helpfully speak of it as an 
existing “social good.”  The complication in the analysis is that one cannot fully 
distinguish the terms on which the good is available from the nature of the good.  As 
Joseph Raz wrote regarding same-sex marriage, “When people demand recognition of 
gay marriages, they usually mean to demand access to an existing good.  In fact they 
also ask for the transformation of that good.  For there can be no doubt that the 
recognition of gay marriage will effect as great a transformation in the nature of 
marriage as that from polygamous to monogamous or from arranged to unarranged 
marriage.”  
Id. (I would suggest a much greater transformation than that.) 
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man/woman couples into what the media calls imprecisely “gay 
marriage” and this article calls genderless marriage.67 
5.  Society’s Compelling Interests in Man/Woman Marriage 
All these social institutional realities regarding marriage bring 
into sharp focus the societal (and hence governmental) interests in 
preserving marriage as the union of a man and a woman.  For it is 
that man/woman meaning, among the complex web of meanings 
constituting the marriage institution, that uniquely and materially 
provides the social goods described above and without which, 
therefore, society would be deprived of those vital social goods.  This 
realization, illuminated by understandings of social institutions in 
general and marriage in particular, renders much less consequential 
the heated battle over the appropriate standard of judicial review of 
constitutional challenges to the legal definition of marriage—whether 
rational basis,68 rational basis with bite,69 intermediate,70 heightened 
intermediate,71 or strict scrutiny.72  That is because society’s interests 
in the perpetuation of those uniquely provided goods seem 
compelling indeed and because what ostensibly73 is sought through 
 
 67. This reality has been understood since before the marriage issue drew public attention.  
Adoption of genderless marriage “has fascinating potential for denaturalizing the gender structure 
of marriage law for heterosexual couples. . . . [T]he impact [of genderless marriage], if such . . . 
prevails, will be to dismantle the legal structure of gender in every marriage.” Nan D. Hunter, 
supra note 53, at 16, 19 (emphasis added). 
 68. Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Com’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
 69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 70. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 71. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 72. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 73. I say “ostensibly” because of strong evidence that the movement to replace man/woman 
marriage with genderless marriage sees that project not as an end in itself but rather as a means to 
an essentially “nonmarriage” end.  Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism and the Federal 
Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 221, 256 nn.181–82 (2005); Stewart & Duncan, 
supra note 9, at 556–58, 581–88; see also Sue Wise and Liz Stanley, Beyond Marriage:  “The Less 
Said About Love and Life-long Continuance Together the Better,” 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 
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this great contest—same-sex couple entry into that institution of 
marriage highly esteemed for so very long now—is simply not 
possible. 
III 
JUDICIAL ELISION OF THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Regarding the phenomenon of judges eliding the social 
institutional argument, an inquiry that aims to be helpful in the on-
going marriage debate in the United States must necessarily look not 
just at domestic but also at Canadian and South African cases.  That 
is so for several interrelated reasons.  Most significantly, despite 
important differences in equality jurisprudence between the three 
nations,74 certain fundamental concepts appear nearly universally in 
the equality jurisprudence of polities with judicial review and 
constitutional equality norms75—a category that includes Canada and 
South Africa as well as the United States. One of the universals in the 
equality equation is the weight of the societal interest advanced, or 
thought to be advanced, by the impugned state action.  The social 
institutional argument aims to give a fair weight to the societal 
interests implicated by the man/woman limitation in marriage.  With 
the judiciary of all three countries having experience with equality-
based demands for the redefinition of marriage,76 the social 
institutional argument has been raised in all three countries—and 
elided in all three countries.  Furthermore, manners of elision that 
 
332, 335 (2004), available at http://fap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/14/2/332 (referencing the 
gay/lesbian rights movement’s advocacy of genderless marriage; “This position acknowledges the 
key, foundational properties of marriage as a social institution, for this is precisely why it is 
thought it will lead to social equality.”) . 
 74. Stewart, supra note 6, at 28–31, 36–38, 100–19. 
 75. Id. at 27.  The nearly universal concepts often carry different labels jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. 
 76. See the cases discussed in the remainder of this Part. 
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have yet to appear in courts in the United States are already apparent 
in Canada and (perhaps) South Africa, providing a preview of 
potential future judicial action and elision stateside. Consequently, 
the foundation exists for a productive and even necessary 
comparative law approach, and indeed a U.S.-centric approach 
would seem to be doomed to inadequacy. 
As of the first week of December 2005, a number of appellate 
courts in the three countries had adjudicated claims to genderless 
marriage.  Of most interest here are the opinions issued by courts 
that had before them at the time, at least in rudimentary form, the 
social institutional argument and in some fashion considered the 
institutional nature of marriage.  I count six cases resulting in such 
opinions: EGALE v. Attorney General (Canada)77 from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in May 2003; Halpern v. Toronto (City)78 
from the Ontario Court of Appeal in June 2003; Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health79 from the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in November 2003; Morrison v. Sadler80 from the 
Indiana Court of Appeals in January 2005; Lewis v. Harris81 from 
New Jersey’s Appellate Division in June 2005; and Minister of Home 
 
 77. [2003] 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472. 
 78. [2003] OJ No 2268, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529. 
 79. 798 N.E.2d 941. (Mass. 2003) 
 80. 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005). 
 81. 875 A.2d 259. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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Affairs v. Fourie82 from South Africa’s Constitutional Court in 
December 2005.83 
The question I want to address is how the judicial opinions 
favoring genderless marriage handled the social institutional 
argument.  Those include EGALE’s three-judge decision mandating 
genderless marriage; Halpern’s equivalent; Goodridge’s three-justice 
plurality opinion; Lewis’s one-judge dissenting opinion; and the 
Fourie decision, which, although not mandating the redefinition of 
marriage, leaving the task of specifying changes in marriage and 
family law to Parliament, nevertheless can be read under certain 
approaches as “favoring” genderless marriage.  For reasons that will 
become clear, I am also interested in the opinion of the judge in 
Pottle v. Attorney General (Canada)84 before the Supreme Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Trial Division, an opinion mandating 
genderless marriage and one that qualifies as a “second-generation” 
judicial handling of the social institutional argument. 
 
 82. CCT 60/04, slip op. (S. Afr. Const. Ct.  Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT60-04).   The lower 
appellate court hearing the South Africa marriage case apparently did not have before it in even 
rudimentary form the social institutional argument, and that court’s opinion suggests no 
awareness of the argument.  Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2005 (3) BCLR 241 (SCA) (S. 
Afr.). 
 83. Also in December 2005, New York’s Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial 
Department, issued Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/ 
2005_09436.htm.  The three-judge majority opinion and the one-judge concurring opinion, in 
rejecting a state constitutional claim for genderless marriage, acknowledge rudimentary aspects of 
the social institutional argument only to the extent that those two opinions, id. at *7, *23, cite and 
quote from Justice Cordy’s articulation of the argument in Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–96.  The 
one-judge dissenting opinion entirely ignores the social institutional argument, although that 
argument engages most points attempted by the dissent. 
 84. See Transcript of Record, Pottle v. Attorney General (Canada), 2004 O1T 3964, available 
at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/Pottle_transcript.pdf. 
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A.  The Dissenting Opinion in Lewis 
Perhaps the most startling judicial performance was the one 
appearing in the dissenting opinion from New Jersey’s Lewis case.  It 
is startling exactly because the dissenting opinion assiduously refused 
to acknowledge or even allude to the social institutional argument 
when that argument was very much on the table.  Both the majority 
opinion and the concurring opinion addressed the social institutional 
nature of marriage, and the concurring opinion sets out in fairly 
complete fashion the social institutional argument.  Thus, the 
concurring opinion notes that marriage is a social institution 
comprised by shared public meanings, that those meanings extend 
beyond the constricted “close personal relationship” model of 
marriage (which “strips the social institution ‘of any goal or end 
beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction 
which the relationship brings to the individuals involved’”), that to 
eliminate the core constitutive meaning of the union of a man and a 
woman would be to render the institution “non-recognizable and 
unable to perform its vital function” and would be to “seriously 
compromise[], if not entirely destablize[] . . . the durability and 
viability of this fundamental social institution,” that the law “‘has a 
purpose and a power to preserve or change public meanings and thus 
a purpose and a power to preserve or change social institutions,’” and 
that “its opposite-sex feature makes it [the marriage institution] 
meaningful and achieves important public purposes,” including the 
public and rational privileging of heterosexual intercourse in 
marriage and the advancement of marriage’s “private welfare” 
purpose.85  Yet from the dissenting opinion not a word about the 
 
 85. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 275–78 (Parrillo, J., concurring). 
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social institutional argument, not a word about what was certainly a 
central pillar of the majority’s reasoning. 
I do not suggest that a judge is somehow bound to address every 
possible argument bearing on his decision.  But I do suggest that 
there is a hierarchy of sources of such arguments and that those 
sources at the top can be ignored only at a price of judicial and 
intellectual integrity.  At the very top perhaps are arguments 
(reasons, if you will) appearing in binding precedent.  Near the top 
would be reasons advanced in sources normally considered 
persuasive and authoritative.  And at least that high would be reasons 
advanced by one’s judicial colleagues in the very same case, especially 
if those reasons are material to the colleagues’ decision.  In Lewis, the 
social institutional argument was material to the decision of the 
majority.  Yet the dissenting opinion chose to not engage that 
argument but rather to remain utterly silent regarding it, and in the 
circumstances that was no doubt a deliberate decision.  In these 
respects, the judicial performance reflected in the Lewis dissenting 
opinion must be adjudged disappointing, if not worse.86 
B.  EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge 
These three 2003 cases mandating genderless marriage are 
helpfully considered together.  Despite the fact that EGALE and 
Halpern are Canadian Charter cases and Goodridge addressed claims 
based on the Massachusetts constitution, there is considerable 
similarity of analytic strategy between the three across a number of 
 
 86. The three-judge plurality opinion and the one-judge concurring opinion in Goodridge 
partake of this same deficiency.  The dissenting opinion of Justice Cordy sets forth the social 
institutional argument in considerable detail, see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–97, but the 
plurality opinion in large measure ignores it and the concurring opinion ignores it completely.  
Perhaps those having enough votes to mandate a result are under less obligation to respond to the 
arguments advanced by their colleagues who do not. 
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issues,87 and that similarity is certainly present with respect to the 
social institutional argument.88 
The EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge courts all proceeded with a 
full awareness of the social institutional nature of marriage.  Indeed, 
the plurality opinion in Goodridge begins: “Marriage is a vital social 
institution.”89  The opinions in that case then go on to refer to 
institution in the context of marriage over 80 times.  The Halpern 
decision has more than 40 such references; the decision in EGALE, 
more than 35.  The Halpern court had the benefit of a cogent 
institutional argument from the Attorney General, which the court 
summarized like this: 
Changing the definition of marriage to incorporate 
same-sex couples would profoundly change the very essence 
of a fundamental societal institution. The AGC points to 
no-fault divorce as an example of how changing one of the 
essential features of marriage, its permanence, had the 
unintended result of destabilizing the institution with 
unexpectedly high divorce rates. This, it is said, has had a 
destabilizing effect on the family, with adverse effects on 
men, women and children. Tampering with another of the 
core features, its opposite-sex nature, may also have 
unexpected and unintended results. 90 
The Goodridge majority had the benefit of Justice Cordy’s 
detailed treatment of the social institutional argument in his 
dissenting opinion.91  Moreover, the three courts repeatedly 
acknowledged both the large change they were mandating in the 
 
 87. Stewart, supra note 6, at 41–99. 
 88. Id. at 75–85. 
 89. 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
 90. 225 D.LR. (4th) 529 at para. 133. 
 91. 798 N.E.2d at 995–97. 
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public meaning of marriage and the law’s strong “educative” or 
“expressive” function in cases such as this.92 
So the important question arises how these courts proceeded to 
reach a conclusion that mandated genderless marriage. 
The first of several answers to that question is that they used what 
fairly may be called the “large change/no change” elision.  As noted, 
the three courts did acknowledge the large change the courts’ 
mandates would effect in the public meaning of marriage.  EGALE 
states that “the relief requested, if granted, would constitute a 
profound change to the meaning of marriage, and would be viewed 
as such by a significant portion of the Canadian public, whether or 
not it supported the change.”93  The lower court in the Halpern case 
expressed the same view,94 and the Goodridge plurality opinion 
stated: “Certainly our decision today marks a significant change in 
the definition of marriage as it has been inherited from the common 
law, and understood by many societies for centuries.”95  But 
juxtaposed with these assessments of “profound” and “significant” 
change of meaning are assertions that the genderless marriage 
decisions do not and will not change the institution of marriage.  
Thus, the Goodridge plurality opinion says, immediately after the 
sentence just quoted: “But it [the court’s decision] does not disturb 
the fundamental value of marriage in our society.”96  And EGALE 
and Halpern, with their adoption of the no-downside argument, 
manifest a similar view.  As just noted, in Halpern the Attorney 
General argued that “[c]hanging the definition of marriage to 
 
 92. Stewart, supra note 6, at 77–80 (collecting citations and quotes from the three cases). 
 93. 2003 BCCA 251 at para. 78. 
 94. [2002] OJ 2714, 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (Ont. Civ. Ct.) at paras. 97–98. 
 95. 798 N.E.2d at 965. 
 96. Id. 
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incorporate same-sex couples would profoundly change the very 
essence of a fundamental societal institution,”97 but the court rejected 
this as “speculative.”98 
These judicial assertions of “no change” in the institution of 
marriage, in light of the acknowledged “profound” and “significant” 
change in the public meaning of marriage, are flatly contradicted by 
social institutional realities.  Social institutions are constituted by—
are nothing other than, if you will—shared public meanings.  To 
change those meanings is to change the institution, including the 
quantity and quality of its social goods.  To change those meanings 
radically is to deinstitutionalize the old institution (and thereby lose 
its social goods) and to replace it with a new one. 
And the argument advanced by Halpern and Goodridge to 
buttress the “no change” assertion is itself contradicted by social 
institutional realities.  The Goodridge plurality opinion presents as 
proof of “no change” the intentions of the same-sex couples then 
before the court: “Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to 
undermine the institution of civil marriage,”99 and: “That same-sex 
couples are willing to [enter civil marriage] . . . is a testament to the 
enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.”100  
Halpern takes the same tack: “The Couples are not seeking to abolish 
the institution of marriage; they are seeking access to it.”101 Yet the 
probative value of such intentions and willingness is not at all 
apparent; it seems nonsensical that the intentions of a handful of 
people could insulate a vast social institution constituted by its public 
 
 97. 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 133. 
 98. Id. at para. 134. 
 99. 798 N.E.2d at 965. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 129. 
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meanings from change resulting from a profound alteration in those 
meanings.  The social reality is that the intentions and conduct of an 
individual or even a small group of individuals can neither prevent 
nor effect institutional change.  This bears repeating: “[T]here are 
acts which are possible only for all individuals, but not for any single 
individual. Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying 
institutions are examples of this.”102 
The second answer to the key question of how these three courts 
handled the social institutional argument is that they used what fairly 
may be called the “selectively impotent law” elision. Again as noted, 
the three courts acknowledged the law’s strong “educative,” or 
“expressive,” function and, indeed, make that function a lynchpin of 
many arguments.  For example, the Goodridge plurality opinion 
speaks of an unchanged definition giving a “stamp of approval” to 
stereotypes.103  And Halpern repeatedly speaks of the definition of 
man/woman marriage “perpetuating” “views” about the capacities of 
same-sex couples.104  Yet the acknowledged educative function of law 
seems to reinforce the lessons of social institutional studies regarding 
civil institutions as webs of significance; law has a purpose and a 
power to preserve or change public meanings and thus a purpose and 
a power to preserve or change social institutions.  More directly to 
the present context, the social institution of marriage is not at all 
immune, but rather is open, to fundamental change resulting from a 
profound change in the law’s definition of marriage.  The three cases 
manifest a quick readiness to acknowledge law’s educative and hence 
society-changing power when some preferred value is being 
advanced, while manifesting a stubborn refusal to acknowledge that 
 
 102. Lagerspetz, supra note 21, at 82. 
 103. 798 N.E.2d at 962. 
 104. E.g., 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529.at para. 94. 
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same power when its use places the goods of man/woman marriage 
at risk.  Yet the law is not both potent and impotent in the very same 
endeavor.105 
It may or may not be a proper judicial role to weigh the societal 
costs against the societal benefits flowing from a profound change in 
the public meanings of marriage (a question addressed later), but the 
three cases’ fundamental inconsistency of approach to benefits and 
costs cannot qualify as a defensible judicial performance. 
The Goodridge plurality opinion contains another elision, one 
unique to itself.  The Commonwealth had pled for the preservation 
of man/woman marriage by pointing to one of its valuable social 
goods: man/woman marriage provides for that child-rearing mode—
married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways not 
subject to reasonable dispute)106 with the optimal outcomes deemed 
crucial for a child’s (and hence society’s) well being.  The plurality 
opinion studiously avoided taking issue with the reality of that social 
good.  What it did rather was shift the asserted State interest from 
protecting the optimal child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage) 
to “[p]rotecting the welfare of children,”107 and, on that shifted basis, 
argued that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not 
promote the present welfare of all children, is contrary to the 
Commonwealth’s policy and practice of helping children whatever 
their family situation, and “penalize[s] children by depriving them of 
 
 105. For a strong rejection of the “impotent law” argument by a leading scholar on historical 
and contemporary marriage in America, see Nancy F. Cott, The Power of Government in 
Marriage, 11 THE GOOD SOCIETY 88 (2002). 
 106. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979–80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 962 (majority opinion). 
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State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual 
orientation.”108 
This analysis is valid only to the extent that protecting the 
optimal child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage) is the same 
governmental endeavor as “protecting the welfare of children” (as the 
plurality opinion uses that phrase).  But this is not at all clear.  
Reflection suggests that the two endeavors are substantially different.  
Protecting the present welfare of individual children found in 
varying circumstances is, in the way the plurality opinion addresses 
it, the provision of public assistance of some form or another to 
individuals (or their care-takers).  By contrast, protecting the optimal 
child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage) entails the protection, 
sustenance, and perpetuation of a social institution.  Thus 
understood, the two different governmental protective endeavors are 
just that, different.  The plurality opinion disappoints in that it 
provides no demonstration of the equivalency or overlap of the two 
endeavors and thus provides no justification for its shift from one to 
the other.  Nor does the difference the plurality opinion ignores seem 
much diminished by the common notion of “child welfare” even 
broadly conceived; that is because the endeavor to protect the 
optimal child-rearing mode, with its institutional focus, looks 
primarily to improve the private welfare received by future 
generations, whereas the personalized protective endeavor made the 
basis of the plurality opinion’s argument is an exercise in the present 
provision of public welfare. 
Simply put then, the Goodridge plurality opinion never honestly 
came to grips with important social institutional realities relative to 
 
 108. Id. at 962–64. 
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man/woman marriage, because it chose yet again to elide those 
realities. 
Finally, there is an elision unique to Halpern.  With respect to the 
Attorney General’s institutional argument, the Halpern court insisted 
that the government must prove with “cogent evidence” that the 
redefinition of marriage would in the future result in any loss of 
valuable social goods or otherwise lead to societal harm.  Ignoring 
the teachings of social institutional studies in general and the power 
of the Attorney General’s specific demonstration—the no-fault 
divorce “reform” battered permanence as a core constitutive 
meaning of the marriage institution, resulting in a great upsurge in 
divorce with all that development’s accompanying and now well-
documented societal harm—the Halpern court labelled any evidence 
of adverse consequences from legal redefinition as “speculative.”109  It 
did this without acknowledging the obvious reason no historical (as 
opposed to “speculative”) evidence exists in the genderless marriage 
context; genderless marriage is a new experiment, and it is the very 
pace of the genderless marriage advocates’ march that leaves 
“unprovable” with historic evidence the experiment’s outcomes.  As 
to the uncontroversial teachings of social institutional studies and 
their illumination of the consequences of institutional exchange, the 
court was silent. 
C.  The Trial Court’s Decision in Newfoundland’s Pottle Case 
The Pottle decision110 merits examination because it is a “second 
generation” case; the judge knew of the defects in Goodridge, Halpern 
and EGALE pointed out above but, apparently believing that he 
 
 109. 225 DLR (4th) 529 at para. 134. 
 110. Transcript, supra note 84. 
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ought to reach the same result, nevertheless made an effort toward an 
original harmonizing of social institutional realities with the 
genderless marriage project.  He failed, in ways that are instructive. 
A person not trained in the law but representing himself, Pastor 
Gordon Young, sought to intervene in Pottle so as to provide a voice 
in favor of preserving man/woman marriage, and the court allowed a 
limited intervention.111  With a remarkable grasp of the social 
institutional realities, Pastor Young presented them in oral argument 
and added this original metaphor (which becomes important in 
understanding the court’s decision): “If you have an orange and an 
apple side-by-side and scoop out the inside of the orange and replace 
it with the apple, you will end up with something that looks like an 
orange on the outside, but in fact its fundamental essence will have 
been changed.  The metaphor, of course, aims to teach the different 
natures of man/woman marriage and genderless marriage.”112 
Immediately after Pastor Young had used the metaphor, the trial 
judge responded in words that merit full quote: 
The metaphor you used, scooping out the orange and putting an 
apple inside, and therefore changing the fundamental character, 
is an intriguing one.  I think what you were saying is that if you 
allow same-sex couples to, if you will, come under the umbrella 
of marriage, to do so you have to strip away some of the 
characteristics or the incidents of marriage, as they have been 
traditionally understood.  Whilst that may be true, when you’re 
looking at marriage as a cultural or a social institution, in so far as 
individuals are concerned, does it affect an opposite-sex couple 
who want to marry and who want to have a marriage 
relationship, if you will, in a traditional form, who subscribe to 
the values of . . . the cooperation between the sexes, procreation, 
and the provision of a mother and father.  Would not an 
expanded definition of marriage still allow those who subscribe to 
 
 111. Id. at 61. 
 112. Id. at 190–91. 
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the traditional notions of marriage, still to have a marriage 
relationship that involves those characteristics and those 
values?113 
To which question Pastor Young replied that the new definition 
would not result in “the old institution enhanced” but would result in 
the “whole institution [being] changed radically” exactly because 
“such profound characteristics are omitted from the existing 
institution.”114 
But the trial judge apparently did not want to leave the analytical 
work there.  He went on to say, again in words that merit full 
quotation: 
People choose to enter the state of matrimony for all sorts of 
reasons, and with varying intentions as to how that relationship 
will develop and be conducted thereafter.  Those who believe that 
marriage is for promoting procreation and ensuring that children 
will have an opportunity for influence by both genders in their 
development, may continue to do so.  In that sense, for them, the 
core of the orange has not changed.  On the other hand, those 
who wish other benefits of marriage . . . may want to avail of the 
relationship of marriage for those other characteristics that are 
associated with it.115 
He then asserted that the fundamental differences between the 
genderless marriage institution and the man/woman marriage 
institution “should not, in principle, matter.”116  With that, the trial 
judge finally concluded that he preferred “not the metaphor of the 
apple inside the orange, but one instead of the apple and the orange 
co-existing side-by-side, under the umbrella of equality.”117 
 
 113. Id. at 194–95. 
 114. Id. at 195. 
 115. Id. at 208. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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The trial court’s analysis, I suggest, does not adequately come to 
grips with at least four social institutional realities.  The first elision is 
a common one in the popular debate, a shift from the macro to the 
micro.  Genderless marriage proponents often deploy the language of 
autonomous individuality.  By that, I mean a discourse focused solely 
on individuals qua individuals, or couples qua couples, with no 
reference to their social context or to institutional realities.  An 
example of this is actually an effective political tactic deployed by 
genderless marriage proponents.  The tactic is to ask, “How can 
letting me and my [same-sex] partner marry in any way hurt your 
marriage?”  Or, “How is Jim and John marrying going to have any 
effect on yours and your husband’s relationship?”  By its very 
language, this question forces the issue into the micro framework, 
that is, it requires that the marriage issue be decided on the basis of 
benefits and harms to specific individuals or couples, as in “me and 
my partner” or “you and your husband.”  And by that same language, 
the question precludes consideration of the marriage issue in the 
macro framework, that is, the framework provided by social 
institutional studies.  Moreover, it is precisely because of this 
“forcing” mechanism that the question is so often an effective 
political tactic.  After all, not many lay people (besides the rare Pastor 
Young) are prepared to respond by saying, “Well, if Jim and John 
marry, that means that our society will have changed a core 
constitutive meaning of the vital social institution of marriage from 
the union of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons.  
With that radical change, the old institution will disappear and 
therefore, necessarily, its invaluable social goods will disappear.  
Those social goods have meant a great deal to my forebears and their 
society and to me and my society and I want my posterity to have 
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those social goods down through their generations, because I don’t 
think they can have a good society without them.” 
Nor, it seems to me, can the macro-to-micro shift be justified by 
the assertion that the constitutional rights at play, whether of equality 
or liberty, are individual rights and that therefore the legal analysis 
must operate at the micro level.  Although the relevant equality and 
liberty rights are indeed individual (or personal) rights, the social 
institutional argument is not advanced to counter abstract notions of 
equality, liberty, or dignity but rather to give a clear understanding of 
the scope and power of the societal (and hence governmental) 
interests at stake in the decision to preserve or jettison the social 
institution of man/woman marriage.  That understanding matters 
very much—unless a court is prepared to hold that genderless 
marriage is an imperative of some absolute right, whether of equality 
or liberty.  At some point any rational equality or liberty 
jurisprudence must, to retain its rationality, give important societal 
interests their due.  The equality and liberty jurisprudence of the 
federal judiciary and of each state judiciary do that.118  Certainly a 
 
 118. It is less certain that Canadian and South African equality jurisprudence give important 
societal interests their due.  Canadian equality jurisprudence requires analysis through two steps.  
The first step, or Section 15 analysis, determines, without any regard to societal interests, whether 
the impugned government action distinguishes between a rightholder and others and thereby 
burdens the former’s sense of dignity in a way that, through the eyes of the rightholder but with a 
bit of objective perception thrown in, is just not right.  If so, that is discrimination.  E.g., Law v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at paras. 21–88.  The 
second step, or Section 1 analysis, determines whether the government can meet a heavy burden 
of justifying that discrimination; it is “the government’s burden under s. 1 . . . to justify a breach of 
human dignity [i.e., to justify a judicially determined ‘discrimination’ made without any regard to 
societal interests].”  Halpern, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 92 (relying on Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 769, at paras. 809–10).  But that analysis must again measure and give full weight to the 
rightholder’s affected interests and self-perceived wounded dignity. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 
at para. 119. In other words, when at last the societal interests are allowed onto the radar screen, 
they must be viewed through a particular filter, the filter of that already determined “breach of 
human dignity.”  South African equality jurisprudence requires a not dissimilar approach, see 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1 
(CC), and indeed is responsive to developments in Canadian equality jurisprudence.  E.g., 
President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), at para. 41. 
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rational constitutional jurisprudence requires, even demands, a clear-
eyed understanding and fair measurement of the societal interests at 
stake in each case invoking personal constitutional rights, and, in the 
marriage cases, that is what the social institutional argument 
provides.  The macro-to-micro shift is a mechanism to obscure that 
understanding and thereby preclude that fair measurement. 
The Pottle trial judge rather expressly made the shift from macro 
to micro.  “Whilst that [the macro social institutional argument] may 
be true, when you’re looking at marriage as a cultural or a social 
institution, [shift to micro] in so far as individuals are concerned, 
does it affect an opposite-sex couple who want to marry and who 
want to have a marriage relationship . . . .”119  This macro-to-micro 
shift elides, of course, the fundamental understanding that marriage 
is a social institution and that marriage therefore cannot be rationally 
or intelligently considered politically (in the broadest sense of the 
word) except on the basis of that understanding.  The trial court 
could not get to where it seemingly wanted to go on the basis of that 
understanding; the court therefore simply shifted the discourse away 
from that macro understanding to the micro world of autonomous 
individuality.  Confronted with the macro understanding, the trial 
court could not rationally deny the profound societal effects of the 
redefinition of marriage, but by shifting to the micro perspective, the 
court could comfortably ignore them. 
The Pottle trial judge also appears to have slipped into an elision 
present in Halpern and Goodridge and discussed above, an avoidance 
of the reality that an individual or even small groups of individuals, 
by their life choices and conduct, can neither sustain nor alter nor 
unmake a vast social institution.  A common and further component 
 
 119. Transcript, supra note 84, at 194. 
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of this elision is the notion that ubiquitous variety in individuals’ 
marriage customs, perceptions, and conduct somehow means that 
the whole institution is up for grabs.  That the judge was laboring 
under this notion is suggested by this language from the bench: 
“People choose to enter the state of matrimony for all sorts of 
reasons, and with varying intentions as to how that relationship will 
develop and be conducted thereafter.”120  Yet this notion elides the 
virtually universal reality that a shared core and constitutive meaning 
of marriage is the union of a man and a woman.121  Although it is 
true that in our society the constitutive meanings of the marriage 
institution do not include a bride in a white wedding gown or a stay-
at-home wife, those meanings most certainly include a bride and a 
groom, a wife and a husband.  And of course it is that core meaning 
of the union of a man and a woman that must go in order for, in the 
judge’s words, “those [that is, same-sex couples] who wish other 
benefits of marriage . . .  to avail of the relationship of marriage . . . 
.”122  And that is a reality the trial court evaded. 
The Pottle court’s “umbrella” metaphor, created as a counter to 
Pastor Young’s “altered orange” metaphor, operates as the court’s 
third elision of social institutional realities.  Recall what the court 
said: “So I prefer, therefore, not the metaphor of the apple inside the 
orange, but one instead of the apple and the orange co-existing side-
by-side, under the umbrella of equality.”123 
 
 120. Id. at 208. 
 121. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 45 (“Marriage is a virtually universal social institution. . . . 
[E]verywhere marriage has something to do with bringing together a man and a woman into a 
public—not merely private—sexual union, in which the rights and responsibilities of the husband 
and wife towards each other and any children their sexual union produces are publicly—not 
privately—defined and enforced.”). 
 122. Transcript, supra note 83, at 208. 
 123. Id. 
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This is an argument that society can indeed sustain at the same 
time two social institutions authoritatively called marriage but 
radically different in their core constitutive meanings.  This is an 
argument that society, at one and the same time, can teach the people 
(especially the children) that marriage means the union of a man and 
a woman and that marriage means the union of any two persons.  
But of course society cannot do that; it is nonsensical to say that it 
can.  This notion of two co-existing “arrangements” makes sense 
only if the court had in mind the de-institutionalization of marriage, 
for a society is capable of accommodating a number of alternative 
lifestyles.  But it seems clear that the court had no such thing in 
mind.  It began its decision by saying: “If there’s one thing that 
everybody agrees on, in this courtroom and in our society today, I 
think is that marriage is a fundamental social institution.”124  Nor did 
the court’s language anywhere suggest that it intended the loss of 
marriage’s social goods, something that must happen when the 
institution providing those goods is deinstitutionalized.  No, the 
thinking reflected in the “umbrella” metaphor is nothing other than 
an elision of uncontroversial social institutional realities. 
The Pottle court’s fourth elision is seen in its adoption of the 
“enclave” argument.  The enclave argument holds that those in our 
society who do not agree with the teachings and formative influences 
of the genderless marriage institution and the interests genderless 
marriage advances can simply retreat to an enclave, whether it be a 
linguistic, social, and/or religious enclave.  In their own enclave, such 
persons would be free to do their own marriage thing unaffected by 
the new social institution.  The judge initially put the argument in 
these words: 
 
 124. Id. at 203. 
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Whilst that may be true, when you’re looking at marriage as a 
cultural or a social institution, in so far as individuals are 
concerned, does it affect an opposite-sex couple who want to 
marry and who want to have a marriage relationship, if you will, 
in a traditional form, who subscribe to the values of . . . the 
cooperation between the sexes, procreation, and the provision of 
a mother and father.  Would not an expanded definition of 
marriage still allow those who subscribe to the traditional notions 
of marriage, still to have a marriage relationship that involves 
those characteristics and those values?125 
He reemphasized the enclave argument with these words: “Those 
who believe that marriage is for promoting procreation and ensuring 
that children will have an opportunity for influence by both genders 
in their development, may continue to do so.  In that sense, for them, 
the core of the orange has not changed.”126 
As I have noted elsewhere,127 there are problems with the notion 
that resourceful people could still find ways to communicate to the 
next generations of children the unique goods of man/woman 
marriage and its value. Certainly some might; by private educational 
endeavor it is possible for families or other groups to establish a sort 
of linguistic enclave in the heart of a community that has no 
comprehension of what matters to them. But to the degree that 
members of the enclave were to adopt the speech of the community, 
they would lose the power to name and, in large part, the power to 
discern what once mattered to their forbears. To that degree, their 
forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them, and probably even 
unintelligible.  (This was Klara’s experience relative to the social 
 
 125. Id. at 194–95. 
 126. Id. at 208. 
 127. Stewart, supra note 6, at 82–83. 
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institution of private property.) The bare possibility that people 
could, with considerable difficulty and sacrifice, maintain the 
meanings for their children of man/woman marriage is therefore just 
that—a bare possibility. 
The possibility becomes even less substantial upon realization 
that 
[t]o change the core meaning of marriage from the union of a 
man and a woman . . . to the union of any two persons [will result 
in] . . . the new meaning [being] mandated in texts, in schools, 
and in many other parts of the public square and voluntarily 
published by the media and other institutions, with society, 
especially its children, thereby losing the ability to discern the 
meanings of the old institution.128 
I therefore think this picture to be misleading: the State of (fill in 
the blank: Massachusetts, California, etc.) as the happy home of 
many different marriage norm communities, each doing its own 
marriage thing, each equally valid before the law, each equally secure 
in its own space. There is reason to believe that the genuinely realistic 
picture as a matter of legal and social fact is far different: The state 
mandates by force of polity-wide law one and only one marriage 
institution and one and only one marriage norm, and that is 
genderless marriage.  After all, the advocates of genderless marriage 
are not taking the position that the law should get out of the marriage 
business and leave the definition of marriage to private action or 
 
 128. Id. at 111. Helen Reece’s observation merits repetition here: 
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm 
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who are 
dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial norm 
community. But this is not a complete solution because the social construction of 
choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem unthinkable or may be too 
costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it may also be merely reactive to 
or even defined by the dominant norm community. 
REECE, supra note 19, at 38. 
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private enclaves.  Quite the contrary, they are insisting that 
constitutional doctrine compels (or public policy makes wise) the 
polity-wide adoption of the genderless marriage institution.  
Consequently, the genderless marriage norm will be mandated in 
and reinforced by texts, mandated in and reinforced by schools, and 
mandated in and reinforced by many other parts of the public square 
and, furthermore, will be voluntarily published by the media and 
other institutions. One marriage norm community will be officially 
sanctioned and protected; all other marriage norm communities will 
be officially constrained, will be officially disdained and sharply 
curtailed.129 
To say otherwise is to say that the law, as an institution itself, 
would not be subject to strong institutional mandates—some 
sounding in logic and consistency, some in more elementary 
considerations—to be persistent and thoroughgoing in enforcing its 
newly declared “constitutional” norm. In the same vein, to say 
otherwise is to say that the law is impotent to reinforce, to alter, or to 
dismantle social institutions, and no rational, informed person says 
that. 
 
 129. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 67 (“If same-sex marriage is a right, powerful legal pressures 
will be brought to bear on religions and other organizations that fail to acknowledge this right.  
The capacity of schools and faith communities to transmit the marriage idea to the next 
generation will be sharply curtailed.  People who believe that children need mothers and fathers 
will be treated like bigots in the public square.”); see also  Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition, 
in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 101–02 (“The preamble to this draft legislation [the 
Chrétien government’s proposed genderless marriage bill of 2003] indicates that redefining 
marriage to make it accessible to same-sex couples will ‘reflect values of tolerance, respect and 
equality’ consistent with the Charter. But of course it follows that those who oppose redefinition 
do not reflect such values. This charge, publicly made and enshrined in law, can only diminish the 
respect in which such people are held . . . .”); Darrel Reid & Janet Epp Buckingham, Whose Rights? 
Whose Freedoms?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 84 (“The fact is that millions of 
Canadians who are opposed to same-sex marriage have now been told by the courts that their 
view on marriage is contrary to the Charter and, by extension, un-Canadian.”). 
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In all these ways, the Pottle trial court’s efforts to harmonize the 
genderless marriage project with social institutional realities must be 
adjudged inadequate. 
D.  The Constitutional Court’s Decision in South Africa’s Fourie 
Case 
Before the Constitutional Court, the South African government 
presented its interests in preserving man/woman marriage by 
referencing the social institutional argument.  The court’s opinion 
expressly mentioned that argument twice, once in the “Justification” 
section130 and once in the “Remedy” section.131 
In the former section, a less than careful reading of the opinion’s 
key paragraph may lead to the belief that the court rejected the social 
institutional argument.132  The key language is this: “Granting access 
to same-sex couples would in no way attenuate the capacity of 
heterosexual couples to marry in the form they wished and according 
to the tenets of their religion.”  But this assertion may or may not 
constitute a rejection (by elision) of the social institutional argument.  
It does not if what same-sex couples are granted “access” to is a legal 
arrangement that does not operate to redefine marriage, and the 
court may well have been contemplating such a possibility because 
the immediately preceding sentence speaks of “enabling same-sex 
couples to enjoy the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities 
that marriage law affords to heterosexual couples.”133  If the court 
were contemplating the redefinition of marriage as the only possible 
 
 130. Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at paras. 110–11 (S. Afr. Const. 
Ct.  Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-
CCT60-04. 
 131. Id. at para. 123. 
 132. Id. at para. 111. 
 133. Id. 
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outcome to its equality analysis, that language would almost certainly 
have been instead the more concise, direct “enabling same-sex 
couples to marry.”  Thus, it would seem that the key to what the 
court was contemplating in this regard is to be found in the opinion’s 
“Remedy” section, and a few paragraphs later I examine that section 
to see what light it sheds on the question of the court’s intent relative 
to the deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage. 
But returning to the “granting access” sentence, that language 
does constitute a rejection (by elision) of the social institutional 
argument if the opinion is mandating the redefinition of marriage 
prerequisite to same-sex couples having “access” to marriage.  Under 
this reading, the opinion is not an engagement with the social 
institutional argument but an elision of it; the bald assertion, the ipse 
dixit, that the redefinition of marriage “would in no way attenuate 
the capacity of heterosexual couples to marry in the form they wished 
and according to the tenets of their religion” is without question a 
macro to micro shift because (under this reading), by speaking of 
heterosexual couples qua heterosexual couples and only in that way, 
the opinion is evading social context and thus social institutional 
realities. 
Under this reading, the opinion must further be seen as adopting 
the discredited “no-downside” argument.134  The classic statement of 
that argument goes something like this: “[R]ecognizing same-sex 
unions will not be likely to deter any heterosexual person from 
marrying or having children.”135  This language suggests, and no 
 
 134. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 35–36, 71–85. 
 135. Bala, supra note 4, at 21; see also Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY 
Slip Op 09436, at *36 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Saxe, J.P., dissenting), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm. (“[I]t is not apparent how 
allowing same-sex couples to marry will have any effect on the continued survival of the 
[marriage] institution itself, or even its ongoing vitality among heterosexuals.”). 
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doubt intends to, that all the goods of man/woman marriage will still 
be available post-redefinition because men and women will continue 
to marry each other at an undiminished rate.  But this suggestion 
misses the point. The point is what the straight men and women will 
be marrying “into.” They will be marrying into a much different 
social institution than their parents married into simply because, 
undeniably, a constitutive core meaning will be radically different. 
And it is not state-sanctioned opposite-sex coupling that produces 
the old institution’s social goods; it is the old institution’s meanings 
that do that.  So with the loss of those meanings comes the loss of the 
social goods and thus the collapse of the “no-downside” argument. 
This realization of what opposite-sex couples will be marrying 
into illuminates a further inadequacy of the “no-downside” 
argument.  Social institutions are renewed and strengthened by use 
consistent with the shared public meanings constituting them. 
“[E]ach use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that 
institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use 
renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage. . . .”136 After 
redefinition, every use of the new institution by a man/woman 
couple will validate and reinforce it; after all, that couple will be 
invoking on their union the sanctioning power of a polity that 
rigorously views their union as one between “two persons.” Because 
those “two persons” happen to be a man and a woman, the 
consequences may initially be misunderstood by many or even most, 
but the strengthening effect on the new institution is largely 
unavoidable.137 Thus the argument—“just as many straight men and 
 
 136. SEARLE, supra note 15, at 57. 
 137. I say “largely” because, as things now stand in Canada and Massachusetts, a man and a 
woman desiring to avoid complicity with the new institutional regime could fulfill that desire—
but only by openly participating in a decidedly exclusive marriage ceremony sanctioned only by a 
decidedly exclusive norm community (in other words, by openly foregoing civilly sanctioned 
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women will marry”—actually cuts against, not in favor of, genderless 
marriage once the social institutional realities are given their due. 
Regarding the two possible readings of the Fourie opinion’s 
treatment of the social institutional argument in its “Justification” 
section, I believe that the more accurate reading clears the court of 
suspicion that it both elided that argument with the macro to micro 
shift and adopted the discredited “no-downside” argument. Analysis 
of the “Remedy” section provides strong support for that belief, and 
that analysis follows. 
The Fourie opinion’s “Remedy” section, in a lengthy discussion,138 
never mandates the redefinition of marriage, does reject the urgings 
of one member of the court139 and of the plaintiff parties 
(applicants)140 that the court do so now, and expressly gives 
Parliament, for at least one year,141 “a free hand . . . within the 
framework established”142 by the opinion to fashion a legislative 
scheme that brings same-sex couples “in from the legal cold.”143 
Regarding “the framework established” by the opinion, the court 
repeatedly makes clear that Parliament’s arrangement need not be a 
redefinition of marriage.  Thus: 
 
genderless marriage by means of a consciously political act). The price for doing so includes 
forfeiting the benefits of civil marriage and being officially labeled as bigoted (or at least 
“discriminatory”)—that is, as hostile to the constitutional ideal of equality.  Interestingly, Fourie 
summarizes a South African Law Reform Commission proposal that would allow for heterosexual 
couples as a matter of “personal choice” to opt for “opposite-sex specific marriages,” legally 
existing parallel to a genderless marriage regime, without forfeiting the benefits of civil marriage. 
Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 143–46. 
 138. Id. at paras. 115–55. 
 139. Id. at  paras. 163–73 (O’Regan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 140. E.g., id. at para. 123. 
 141. Id. at paras. 156–61. 
 142. Id. at para. 155. 
 143. Id. at para. 138. 
01__STEWART.DOC 11/1/2007  3:33:44 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 54 ? 
The simple textual change pleaded for by the Equality Project 
[redefining marriage] and the comprehensive legislative project 
being finalised by the [South Africa Law Reform Commission, 
creating parallel man/woman marriage and genderless marriage 
legal regimes], do not, however, necessarily exhaust the legislative 
paths which could be followed to correct the defect.144 
More: 
Thus a legislative intervention which had the effect of enabling 
same-sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements and 
responsibilities that heterosexual couples achieve through 
marriage, would without more override any discriminatory 
impact flowing from the common law [man/woman] definition 
standing on its own.  . . . The effect would be that formal 
registration of same-sex unions [note “unions,” not “marriages”] 
would automatically extend the common law and statutory legal 
consequences to same-sex couples that flow to heterosexual 
couples from marriage.145 
As a final example, the opinion speaks of “leaving Parliament 
free, if it chose, to amend the law so as to provide an alternative 
statutory mechanism to enable same-sex couples to enjoy their 
constitutional rights . . . .”146 
 
 144. Id. at para. 147. 
 145. Id. at para. 122. 
 146. Id. at para. 135 (emphasis added).   In considering what South African constitutional 
norms require for same-sex couples (as opposed to allow), in at least sixteen instances the Fourie 
opinion uses careful language that stops short (no doubt consciously) of requiring that marriage 
be redefined as the union of any two persons.  Id. at paras. 44 (“Are gay and lesbian people 
unfairly discriminated against because they are prevented [not from marrying but] from 
achieving the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities which heterosexual couples acquire 
from marriage?”); 62 (speaking of “the consequences of total exclusion of same-sex couples from 
[not marriage but] the solemnities and consequences of marriage”); 71 (after a long description of 
the incidents of civil marriage, stating that the “exclusion of same-sex couples [not from marriage 
but] from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage” renders such couples “outsiders”); 72 
(noting “intangible damage” to same-sex couples, including their present inability “to celebrate 
their commitment to each other [not in a marriage ceremony but] in a joyous public event 
recognized by the law,” and stating that “[i]f heterosexual couples have the option of deciding 
whether to marry or not, so should same-sex couples have the choice as whether to seek to 
achieve [not marital status but] a status and a set of entitlements and responsibilities [not 
identical to but] on a par with those enjoyed by heterosexual couples.”); 75 (“It is clear that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples [not from marriage but] from the status, entitlements and 
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This conclusion—that the Fourie opinion leaves Parliament free 
to provide a legal arrangement for same-sex couples that does not 
redefine marriage—is supported, not undermined, by three other 
portions of the opinion that in some way take up the concept of 
redefinition. 
First is the portion where the opinion addresses the contention of 
the government and amici that “whatever remedy the state adopts 
cannot include altering the definition of marriage” contained in the 
impugned laws, that is, the union of a man and a woman.147  The 
opinion rejects the four arguments advanced in support of this 
contention148 and, in doing so, of course rejects the contention.  But 
note carefully what the contention is.  The contention is simply that 
 
responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through marriage, constitutes a denial to them 
of their right to equal protection and benefit of the law.”); 77 (“The problem is that the Marriage 
Act simply makes no provision for them [i.e., same-sex couples] [not to marry but] to have their 
unions recognized and protected in the same way as it does for those of heterosexual couples.”); 
78 (the unconstitutional defect is that “the law in the past failed to secure for same-sex couples 
[not marriage but] the dignity, benefits and responsibilities that it accords to heterosexual 
couples”); 79 (the impugned laws constitute “unfair discrimination . . . to the extent that the law 
makes no provision for them [i.e., same-sex couples] [not to marry but] to achieve the dignity, 
status, benefits and responsibilities available to heterosexual couples through marriage”); 81 (to be 
constitutional sufficient, the law “would also have to accord to same-sex couples [not entry into 
marriage but] a public and private status equal to that which heterosexual couples achieve from 
being married”); 82 (the impugned laws are “unconstitutional to the extent that they make no 
appropriate provision for gay and lesbian people [not to marry but] to celebrate their unions in 
the same way that they enable heterosexual couples to do so”); 87 (the “procreation argument . . . 
cannot prevail in the face of the claim of same-sex couples to be accorded [not marriage but] the 
status, entitlements, and responsibilities which heterosexual couples receive through marriage”); 
98 (speaking of “the right of same-sex couples [not to marry but] to enjoy the same status, 
entitlements and responsibilities as marriage law accords to heterosexual couples”);  105 (same as 
just quoted); 114 (the failure of the impugned laws, not to redefine marriage as the union of any 
two persons but, “to provide the means whereby same-sex couples can enjoy the same status, 
entitlements and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through marriage, constitutes 
an unjustifiable violation of their” constitutional rights); 117 (the law relative to marriage vows is 
deficient not because same-sex couples cannot take those vows but because the law does not allow 
“for an equivalent [not the same] public declaration being made by same-sex couples”); 118 (the 
impugned laws are unconstitutional to the “extent that they make no provision for same-sex 
couples [not to marry but] to enjoy the status, entitlements and responsibilities it accords to 
heterosexual couples”). 
 147. Id. at para. 83. 
 148. Id. at paras. 84–109. 
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“the state,” meaning each branch of the government, is powerless to 
alter the man/woman definition.  The opinion here rejects this 
contention, as it must to validate what it does later—declare that, by 
judicial act, marriage will be redefined if, within one year, Parliament 
does not provide an adequate legal arrangement for same-sex 
couples.149  In short, nothing in this portion of the opinion amounts 
to a holding that Parliament must redefine marriage, only that it may. 
The second portion addresses the question of what is to be done 
with the old common law definition of marriage.  The opinion says 
that “the common law definition of marriage is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid to the extent that if fails to provide to same-
sex couples the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities 
which it accords to heterosexual couples.”150  But the “question then 
arises whether, having made such a declaration, the Court itself 
should develop the common law so as to remedy the consequences of 
the common law’s under-inclusive character.”151  The court’s answer 
is “no,”152 at least for the year that Parliament is given to enact 
comprehensive legislation.  This is because the court could 
take account of the impact that any correction to the [Marriage] 
Act, or enactment of a separate statute, would automatically have 
on the common law.  Thus a legislative intervention which had 
the effect of enabling same-sex couples to enjoy the status, 
entitlements and responsibilities that heterosexual couples 
achieve through marriage, would without more override any 
discriminatory impact flowing from the common law definition 
standing on its own.153 
 
 149. Id. at para. 161. The court, unlike Parliament, has available to it of course only the blunt 
tool of the redefinition of marriage. 
 150. Id. at para. 120. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at paras. 122, 135, 139. 
 153. Id. at para. 122. 
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With these words regarding “a separate statute” and “enabling 
same-sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements and 
responsibilities that heterosexual couples achieve through marriage,” 
the court yet again154 made clear that an acceptable Parliamentary 
solution need not be the redefinition of marriage.  And equally 
clearly, the Fourie opinion did not alter the common law definition 
of marriage to the union of any two persons. 
The third portion covers the opinion’s firm rejection of a 
“separate but equal” legal arrangement flowing from discriminatory 
animus.155  That portion does not support the notion that Parliament 
must redefine marriage because the separate-but-equal rejection is 
immediately followed by these careful words: 
It is precisely sensitivity to context and impact that suggest 
that equal treatment does not invariably require identical 
treatments. . . . Differential treatment in itself does not 
necessarily violate the dignity of those affected.  It is when 
separation implies repudiation, connotes distaste or inferiority 
and perpetuates a caste-like status that it becomes 
constitutionally invidious.156 
Those careful words rather plainly allow rather than reject a 
Parliamentary solution that does not redefine marriage. 
The interesting question arising from all this—that is, from the 
Fourie opinion’s forceful and at times moving language calling for 
equality, dignity, and respect for gay men and lesbians, on one hand, 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at paras. 150–51. 
 156. Id. at para. 152.  Of course, Parliamentary action that accommodates same-sex couples 
but does not redefine marriage, when taken on the basis of the social institutional argument, 
would partake of no discriminatory animus.  The purpose of that argument, its animus if you will, 
is to preserve the vital social goods provided uniquely by man/woman marriage; the argument is 
devoid of animus towards gay men and lesbians in our society.  See infra Section V. 
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and, on the other hand, the opinion’s refusal to judicially redefine 
marriage to achieve that equality, dignity, and respect coupled with 
its deference to Parliament to select a solution, including one that 
does not redefine marriage—is whether there is a way to plausibly 
and rationally harmonize those two fundamental aspects of the 
opinion.  I suggest that there is a way.  That way is to understand that 
the justices comprehended and respected the social institutional 
argument.  Reflection sustains this understanding. 
First, there is the Fourie opinion’s very curious approach to the 
social institutional argument in the “Remedy” section.  The 
government and pro-marriage amici had “argued forcibly against” 
judicial redefinition of marriage as a remedy because such a remedy 
“would not merely modify a well-established institution” but “would 
completely restructure and possibly even destroy it as an 
institution.”157  The court saw this as a “three-fold” argument: 
[F]irst, that time should be given for the public to be involved in 
an issue of such great public interest and importance; second, 
that it was neither competent nor appropriate for the Court itself 
to restructure the institution of marriage in such a radical way; 
and third, that only Parliament had the authority to create such a 
radical remedy . . . .158 
The court followed by saying that it would “start”159 with the 
public involvement component, a component the opinion rejects 
because of the substantial public involvement relative to the South 
Africa Law Reform Commission endeavor.160  After that “start,” 
however, the opinion does not expressly signal that it is next 
addressing the second and third components of the government’s 
 
 157. Id. at para. 123. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at para. 124. 
 160. Id. at paras. 124–31. 
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argument, the respective competence of the court and of Parliament 
to “radically restructure and possibly even destroy” the man/woman 
marriage institution.  Indeed, the opinion thereafter never counters 
or even questions the government’s argument about adverse 
institutional impacts.  What the opinion does do, in those following 
paragraphs, is defer to Parliamentary competence and, as shown 
above, give Parliament the leeway to provide to same-sex couples a 
legal arrangement that does not redefine marriage, an arrangement 
that thus would avoid all the ill effects to result from 
deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage.  That deference 
reflects respect for rather than repudiation of the social institutional 
argument. 
It is true that, in providing for judicial redefinition if Parliament 
does not act within one year,161 the opinion validates the court’s raw 
power to so act.  But one senses the court’s belief that Parliament will 
act timely and adequately; to deny that belief is to ascribe a deep 
cynicism to the court.  And a court with a grasp of the social 
institutional realities will want, for reasons of the court’s own 
institutional interests, any redefinition, if it is to happen, to be a 
legislative rather than a judicial act.  In that way, adverse 
consequences of deinstitutionalization can plausibly be labelled the 
responsibility of another branch of government; after all, the court 
can always say truthfully, as demonstrated above, that it gave 
Parliament the leeway to provide a legal arrangement for same-sex 
couples that did not require the redefinition of marriage.162 
 
 161. Id. at para. 161. 
 162. Relatedly, the court certainly must have recognized that only Parliament had the tools to 
craft a sophisticated legal arrangement accommodating and reconciling the many social interests 
at stake, the court by contrast having only a blunt tool, the redefinition  or not of marriage. 
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Finally, there is this: The Fourie opinion was authored by Justice 
Albie Sachs.  He is a brilliant person of vast learning.163  It is therefore 
virtually certain that he has, and probably has had for a long time, a 
firm grasp of the understandings and insights emerging from social 
institutional studies and comprising the building blocks of the social 
institutional argument for the preservation of man/woman marriage; 
those understandings and insights are uncontroversial among those 
who have seriously attended to the subject.164  This is not to say that 
Justice Sachs accepts all aspects of the social institutional argument as 
set forth here or that argument’s ultimate conclusion in favor of 
preservation, but it is to say with some confidence that his would not 
be a mind that would lightly dismiss (or dismiss at all) the reality that 
changing core meanings constitutive of a vital social institution must 
inevitably have profound social impacts.  His understanding that 
some of those impacts could be adverse is consistent with his 
opinion’s act of sending the issue to Parliament with the power in 
Parliament, if it chooses, to not redefine marriage. 
For these reasons, it seems valid to see the Fourie opinion as 
respecting, not rejecting by elision or otherwise, the social 
institutional argument.  A contrary view of the opinion, given the 
opinion’s careful language, seems hardly defensible.  In any event, the 
validity of both possible views will likely be put to the test; post-
Fourie, the gay/lesbian rights movement in South Africa has stated its 
intention to challenge in court any Parliamentary resolution other 
 
 163. My positive authority for that assertion is my careful reading over a number of years of 
his judicial opinions; my negative authority, no knowledgeable person will deny the assertion. 
 164. See note 53 supra. 
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than one redefining marriage from the union of a man and a woman 
to the union of any two persons.165 
IV 
NON-JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT  
WITH THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
I see two efforts to engage to some extent the social institutional 
argument.  The first may be fairly called the “evolving marriage 
institution” argument; the second, the “overt social engineering” 
argument. 
A.  The “Evolving Marriage Institution” Argument 
This argument’s most recent and perhaps most articulate 
iteration is Nicholas Bala’s,166 and it is that iteration that I will follow 
most closely. 
The argument is premised most fundamentally on the 
uncontroversial understanding that marriage always has been and 
continues to be an “evolving” social institution.  In Professor Bala’s 
words: 
[M]arriage has not been a static social or legal institution.  Rather 
marriage has changed over the course of history in response to 
changing religious beliefs, social values and behaviors, technology 
and even demographics.  Similarly there is great variation today 
in marital behaviors, attitudes and laws about marriage in 
different countries.167 
He further builds on the likewise uncontroversial understanding 
that “marriage laws [have] both reflected and reinforced changes in 
 
 165. Telephone interview with Hazel Shelton, South African government lawyer in the Fourie 
case (Dec. 8, 2005). 
 166. Bala, supra note 4. 
 167. Id. at 1. 
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attitudes towards and behavior in marriage.”168  This language calls to 
mind the uncontroversial social institutional reality that society uses 
the law’s authoritative voice to reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the 
shared public meanings that constitute a social institution. 
Professor Bala’s next step also calls to mind another 
uncontroversial social institutional reality.  He focuses particularly 
on those changes in the law that, in his judgment, both logically 
support and lead public opinion to support the next “inevitable” 
change in marriage law, the redefinition of marriage from the union 
of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons.  He says, “In 
both Canada and the USA the laws and expectations for husbands 
and wives within marriage have changed dramatically over the past 
half century, setting the stage for the possible redefinition of 
marriage to include same-sex partners.”169  The institutional reality 
underlying and supporting this step is simply this: The shared 
meanings that constitute a social institution interact and are 
interdependent; each meaning affects and is dependent on all the 
others. “An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and 
informal—governing social relationships.”170 
The legal changes on which Bala relies are those moving away 
from gender-based rights and roles towards legal equality of 
spouses;171 away from “the procreation of children . . . as a central 
purpose of marriage, as . . . reflected in the common concept of 
consummation;”172 away from no legal protection (even penalties) for 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 4. 
 170. Nee & Ingram, supra note 16, at 19. 
 171. “Spouses are viewed as legally equal.  Gender roles in marriage are no longer legally 
prescribed.”  Bala, supra note 4, at 8. 
 172. Id. at 4. 
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unwed, co-habiting couples and their offspring towards legal 
provision to them of a variety of rights and protections;173 and away 
from the recognition of natural parenthood (that is, parenthood 
arising from biological ties) towards the recognition of legal 
parenthood (that is, parenthood as solely a status conferred by law, 
which may or may not consider biological ties).174  Regarding the 
elimination of gender rights and roles in marriage, he says: “It is 
more difficult to argue that marriage requires two spouses of 
opposite gender, since there are no longer legally specified gender 
roles, and socially there is growing ambiguity about the roles of 
‘husband’ and ‘wife.’”175  Regarding both marriage-like legal 
arrangements governing unwed, co-habiting couples and the 
recognition of legal parenthood, he says: “The approach of Canadian 
courts and legislatures to unmarried opposite-sex partners and 
relationships of children to psychological parents has . . . laid the 
ground work for a more flexible approach for the more recent 
recognition of same-sex relationships.”176 
Although Bala does not provide anywhere a summary of his 
response to the social institutional argument, it seems that his 
response can be fairly abridged to this: The social and legal trends 
relative to the marriage institution are clear; the constitutive 
meanings of the institution are changing in a way that must 
inevitably lead to the law’s replacement of the core man/woman 
meaning with the “any two persons” meaning. 
 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. Id. at 8.  Bala does not note this but C-38, the Canadian law mandating genderless 
marriage, contains a provision, albeit amending the Income Tax Act, expressly replacing natural 
parenthood with legal parenthood. 
 175. Id. at 8. 
 176. Id. at 15. 
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An evaluation of Bala’s response, it seems to me, requires the 
application of two important distinctions.  The first is between 
institutional change resulting from forces other than the law, on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, law-mandated institutional change.  In 
other words, the law can either require or merely reflect institutional 
change, and those are different phenomenon.  With some subjects, 
those two phenomenon may play on each other so subtly and 
imperceptibly that they appear as one.  But that is certainly not the 
North American marriage experience.  But for EGALE and Halpern, 
there would be no genderless marriage in Canada today.  In the 
presence of authoritative court decisions holding that man/woman 
marriage is compatible with and can certainly continue to be 
nurtured under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there 
would be no genderless marriage in Canada for a long time, if ever.177  
But for Goodridge, there would be no genderless marriage anywhere 
in the United States today, and most probably that would continue to 
be the case for a long time.  To state the obvious in slightly different 
words, it was EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge that switched the 
meaning of marriage at its core, not society.178  As noted earlier, while 
it is true that in our society the shared constitutive meanings of the 
marriage institution do not include a large number of less central 
 
 177. In a May 2003 seminar at Oxford University on the marriage issue in Canada and the 
United States, genderless marriage advocate Professor Robert Wintemute said that if the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that man/woman marriage was compatible with the Charter (a possibility 
he was not willing to seriously entertain), Parliament would not enact C-38, the genderless 
marriage bill.  In December 2004, that court refused to answer the question, leaving EGALE and 
Halpern as the two authoritative voices on the Charter issue.  In July 2005, Parliament enacted C-
38 after its proponents successfully cast the issue as one strictly of Charter rights and therefore 
human rights.  The preamble to C-38 repeats that rhetoric. 
 178. Because of the nature of the remedy in South Africa’s Fourie case (leaving it to 
Parliament, until December 1, 2006, to find “the best ways of ensuring that same-sex couples are 
brought in from the legal cold”), it is too early to characterize the nature of the phenomenon in 
that country.  Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 138 (S. Afr. Const. 
Ct  Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-
CCT60-04. 
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practices, those shared constitutive meanings most certainly include 
a bride and a groom, a wife and a husband.  And that will continue to 
be the case even in Canada until the revolution consolidates its 
position, something that institutional studies suggest will not take 
long. 
For reasons that should become clear, the second important 
distinction is related practically to the first.  That is the distinction 
between judge-made law and legislation.  In the world, we see judicial 
redefinition of marriage with no legislative role (Massachusetts), 
legislative redefinition of marriage pursuant or in response to a 
judicial mandate (Canada), and legislative redefinition without 
judicial involvement (Netherlands, Belgium, Spain).  Speaking 
generally, it seems fair to say that the third phenomenon is much 
more likely to reflect rather than require sea changes relative to the 
core constitutive meanings of marriage.  The legislative redefinition 
in Europe, even in Spain, appears to have majority support, which 
may flow from favor for justice/equality notions (a matter discussed 
below), from ignorance of the social institutional realities at play, 
from apathy relative to the man/woman marriage institution, 
including a devaluing of its social goods, or from some combination 
of those.  As already demonstrated, the North American experience 
in contrast has been one of judge-made law requiring, not reflecting, 
social favor for the replacement of man/woman marriage with 
genderless marriage. 
My first criticism of Professor Bala’s response to the social 
institutional argument is its failure to work through the implications 
of these two distinctions.  The response is, after all, a response to an 
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argument deployed in very large measure in the judicial arena.179  It 
seems the response therefore should concern itself with arguments 
appropriately made to a judge resolving (at least ostensibly) a 
constitutional equality or liberty claim.  What arguments Bala’s 
response is making to a judge in that context are not at all clear to 
me.  But here are some guesses, with critiques. 
Bala may be saying to a judge, “The direction and pace of the 
social/legal changes relative to the marriage institution make 
inevitable the big change to genderless marriage.  Therefore, you can 
greatly discount the societal interests in man/woman marriage’s 
social goods because of those goods’ very short shelf-life.”  The 
validity of this argument, of course, depends on the validity of the 
claim of inevitability, a claim founded on a confidently made reading 
of where social currents in history will certainly carry the marriage 
institution.  Although the message of inevitability is a brilliant 
political move,180 as an intellectual proposition it is dubious.  For my 
part, I am prepared to accord to the inevitability message relative to 
genderless marriage all the respect and all the acknowledgements of 
validity due to another message of inevitability clearly to be perceived 
 
 179. The social institutional argument is deployed in the legislative arena to a much lesser 
extent, probably for two reasons.  First, other than California’s, no state legislature has yet 
seriously considered redefining marriage.  Second, it seems that until recently that argument’s 
depth has not been fully congenial with the level of discourse that largely prevails in that arena. 
 180. This message of inevitability is a brilliant political move because it strengthens and 
encourages the troops on one side to see the long conflict through to its inevitable glorious 
outcome.  At the same time, the message is influential in making those whose hearts and minds 
have them on the other side of the conflict more passive, more defeatist, less willing to make the 
kinds of sacrifices that could well make a material difference in the conflict.  This past year, that 
phenomenon was seen first hand in Canada among those (actually a majority) who wanted to 
preserve marriage as the union of a man and a woman.  Also, it seems at least interesting that so 
many different social movements have as a core belief the inevitability of the movement’s 
triumph.  I was recently reminded that Christianity is like that.  An evangelical minister, 
discouraged by events in Canada and trying to cheer up himself and those around him, said, 
“Well, I peeked and read the last chapter, and we win.”  He was referring of course to the Book of 
Revelation, with its message of the final triumph of Christianity. 
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in powerful social currents revealed by history, the message preached 
by Karl Marx.  If nothing else, the course of Marxism should teach us 
to be amply humble when setting forth, as an intellectual 
proposition, the inevitability of something as radical as the 
deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage and its replacement 
by the institution of genderless marriage.181 
A particularly toxic aspect of the inevitability argument in the 
judicial arena is its proclivity to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Each judge who acts on the basis of the argument supplies further 
“evidence” of the inevitability of genderless marriage.  It is entirely 
plausible that a bare majority of the judges (21 individuals) on the 
highest courts of a handful of key states—Massachusetts (a 4-3 
decision), Washington, New Jersey, California, and New York—will 
play a material role in replacing man/woman marriage with 
genderless marriage.  To then label that outcome the result of 
irresistible social forces is to be devious; to label it the work of 21 
individuals who could have (and almost certainly should have)182 
chosen to do otherwise is to be very much more accurate. 
Bala may also be saying to a judge, “The direction and pace of the 
social/legal changes relative to the marriage institution means that 
the change to genderless marriage must be seen as a relatively small 
and evolutionary step, which means in turn that the societal impacts 
will be small and readily accommodated, without any serious societal 
harm.”  This argument can be seen as building on the social 
institutional realities that the shared meanings constituting a social 
 
 181. Maggie Gallagher strongly counters the “inevitability” argument in Gallagher, supra note 
8, at 68–69, and in Joshua K. Baker & Maggie Gallagher, Not Inevitable, National Review Online 
(Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baker_gallagher200412010836.asp. 
 182. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 130–32 (a summary of how the EGALE, Halpern, and 
Goodridge courts “did an unacceptable job with their performance of the very tasks that lie at the 
heart of judicial responsibility in virtually every case”). 
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institution interact and are interdependent and that in that web of 
interrelated norms governing social relationships relative to marriage 
are to be seen a number of fairly recently changed meanings. 
But this argument ignores other social institutional realities.  One 
is that, although constitutive meanings interact, some of the social 
goods provided by an institution flow quite particularly from one 
core meaning.  Here is an example: Prior to the mid-1970’s, a core 
meaning of marriage was permanence.  That particular institutional 
meaning succeeded, to a degree that now looks remarkable, in 
teaching and forming individuals, in molding their identities, and in 
restraining antithetical impulses in a way that led to a relatively low 
rate of divorce and separation.  Among the resulting social goods 
were a relatively high level of family stability and a relatively high and 
concomitant level of childhood well-being (emotional, psychological, 
and financial).  In a surge of “reform” between the mid-1960’s and 
the mid-1970’s, however, American and Canadian legislatures 
adopted legislation providing for no-fault divorce.183 In this way and 
at this time, it seems fair to say, the law’s authoritative voice at least 
for a while effectively minimized permanence as a constitutive 
meaning of the marriage institution.  In the light of social 
institutional studies, what in fact then happened was unsurprising: In 
the ensuing years divorce skyrocketed184 and the number of children 
 
 183. By 1977, all but seven states had enacted no-fault divorce, and four of those seven 
followed within several years.  Illinois made the change in 1984; South Dakota, in 1985, Utah, in 
1987.  Paul A. Nakonezny, Robert D. Shull, and Joseph Lee Rodgers, The Effect of No-Fault 
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education, and 
Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 477, 480 (1995). 
 184. In 1965, the American divorce rate was 10.6 per 1,000 married women age 15 and older; 
in 1985, it was 21.7.  The National Marriage Project, The State of Our Unions 2004 at 19, available 
at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/SOOU2004.pdf. 
In and of itself, conclusive proof of correlation (the timing of the no-fault divorce “reform” 
and of the upsurge in divorces) is not conclusive proof of causation (the “reform” as a substantial 
cause of the upsurge).   But the correlation is certainly good evidence relative to the causation 
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of divorce rose to many millions.185  The further results, now 
extraordinarily well documented, have been substantial injury to the 
physical, psychological, emotional, and financial well-being both of 
those made children of divorce by that “divorce revolution” and of 
their mothers.186 
Bala’s response does not explain how past changes of some 
constitutive meanings of marriage (whether for good or for ill) make 
more or less wise the proposed elimination of the man/woman 
 
issue, and once it is paired with social institutional studies, the evidence it seems to me should at 
least shift the burden of proof and persuasion to those who would absolve the no-fault divorce 
“reform” of responsibility.  See Nakonezny et al., supra note 183, at 487 (“[T]he enactment of no-
fault divorce law had a clear positive influence on divorce rates.”) 
 185. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS:  THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF 
DIVORCE (2005). 
 186. E.g., id.; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS, SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED 
LEGACY OF DIVORCE:  A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000); LINDA J. WAITE & 
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:  WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, 
HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE 
CULTURE:  RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY (1996). 
Professor Bala attempts to dispute or at least downplay the social institutional realities 
underlying what he calls the “divorce revolution.”  Bala, supra note 4, at 6–7.  He says that there is 
“controversy about whether the adoption of a no-fault regime is related to any long term effects 
on rates of divorce and family breakdown” and that “adoption of a no-fault regime is weakly 
correlated with increases in long term divorce rates.”  Id. at 7.  He suggests that “[m]ost if not all 
of the increase in divorce rates in North America is attributable to a complex interaction of social, 
cultural and economic factors.” 
A footnote is not a good place to ventilate well a correlation/causation issue, see note 182 
above, like this one.  But these observations seem justified.  Bala ignores the insights and even 
predictive power of social institutional studies in discussing the issue.  He also fails to address a 
scientifically rigorous study of the question, Nakonezny et al., supra note 183, and therefore fails 
to come to grips in an equally rigorous way with its conclusion:  “[T]he enactment of no-fault 
divorce law had a clear positive influence on divorce rates.”  Id. at 487.  Bala’s argument also 
violates the rule of Ockham’s Razor in that, without demonstrating the inadequacy of the more 
parsimonious explanation (correlation plus the insights of social institutional studies), it rests on a 
multiplicity of vaguely alluded to “social, cultural, and economic factors” in “complex 
interaction.”  Bala, supra note 4, at 5.  See Paul Vincent Spade, Ockham’s Nominalist Metaphysics:  
Some Main Themes, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO OCKHAM (Paul Vincent Spade ed., 1999) 
at 101–02.  Finally, Bala’s approach is marred by a certain inconsistency.  He minimizes the law’s 
impact on a marriage negative (great increase in divorce) but maximizes the law’s impact in 
paving the way for what he views as a marriage positive (genderless marriage).  E.g., Bala, supra 
note 4, at 26 (“As a result of constitutional litigation, the Canadian courts prodded reluctant 
politicians to take action on a controversial issue . . . .”). 
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meaning.  Unless he is arguing that change for change’s sake is good, 
it seems fair to require that his (or any) response based on the 
“evolving” nature of marriage demonstrate the wisdom of the next 
proposed change.  After all, the valuable social goods identified at 
this article’s outset result in large measure or entirely from the 
man/woman meaning.  To lose that meaning is to lose those goods, 
just as the loss of the core meaning of permanence meant the loss of 
its goods—a loss now viewed, in the midst of considerable resulting 
suffering, as grievous.  Any comfort derived from this assurance thus 
seems illusory: “Genderless marriage must be seen as a relatively 
small and evolutionary step, which means in turn that the societal 
impacts will be small and readily accommodated, without any serious 
societal harm.” 
One other aspect of Bala’s response merit analysis.  That response 
is replete with references to religious folks’ opposition to genderless 
marriage.187  Those references are entirely appropriate to 
demonstrate the social/political dynamics leading to adoption, or 
not, of genderless marriage; his response helpfully discusses both the 
legal and the non-legal aspects of “evolving” marriage.  But a 
question arises whether, intending to or not, the response is also 
suggesting that the arguments against the move to genderless 
marriage all derive ultimately from religious tradition and discourse.  
If so, that suggestion is disquieting.  As Margaret Somerville has 
noted: 
One strategy used by same-sex marriage advocates is to label 
all people who oppose same-sex marriage as doing so for 
religious or moral reasons in order to dismiss them and their 
arguments as irrelevant to public policy.  Good secular reasons to 
 
 187. Bala, supra note 4, at 1–6, 25, 32, 38. 
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oppose same-sex marriage are re-characterized as religious or as 
based on personal morality and, therefore, as not applicable at a 
societal level. . . .  These [tactics] . . . do not serve the best 
interests of either individuals or society in this debate.188 
Whatever the religiosity (or otherwise) of those advancing the 
social institutional argument, the argument itself unquestionably 
qualifies as “good secular reasons,” or as Rawlsian “public reason.”189  
Indeed, the social institutional argument rather precisely meets the 
high standard urged by Linda McClain: “The requirements of public 
reason would . . . require the delineation of precisely how same-sex 
marriages threaten the institution of marriage in terms of public 
reasons and political values implicit in our public culture.” 190 
B.  The “Overt Social Engineering” Argument 
This argument generally proceeds in two steps.  To begin, the 
argument accepts, at least implicitly, virtually all the building blocks 
of the social institutional argument.  On that basis, it then asserts 
that, exactly because of the powerful formative and transformative 
nature of social institutions, especially marriage, this core 
man/woman meaning must be changed, for to do so will result in a 
more just and equal society. 
This argument partakes of intellectual honesty and moral 
bravery. It is intellectually honest to the extent it does not elide social 
institutional realities, realities that those who have attended 
rigorously to institutional studies deem essentially uncontroversial.  
It is morally brave to the extent it speaks publicly of the ultimate 
 
 188. Somerville, supra note 34, at 70–71. 
 189. E.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
 190. Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1998). 
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objective of the redefinition project, to use institutional power to 
transform the hearts and minds of the general populace in a way that 
assures full public acceptance of gay and lesbian identities and 
lifestyle.  Such public acknowledgement of that ultimate objective is 
rare.  Recent scholarship from man/woman marriage proponents has 
pointed to that ultimate objective,191 as has the South Africa 
Constitutional Court.192 Bala almost gets there: 
Further, it is clear that for a variety of social, psychological and 
legal reasons, only a minority of homosexuals in long-term 
relationships will exercise the right to marry in the foreseeable 
future.  Nevertheless, the recognition of same-sex marriage is of 
profound symbolic significance, both for advocates and 
opponents.  The [favorable] court decisions about same-sex 
marriage and the ultimate [Canadian] government response 
recognize the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to full 
equality under the law and provide important social validation of 
these relationships.193 
But beyond these and a few other scattered acknowledgements 
about an ultimate “non-marriage” objective rooted in social 
institutional realities,194 there is silence in the public marriage debate. 
 
 191. Wardle, supra note 73, at 256 nn.181–82; Stewart & Duncan, supra note 9. 
 192. Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 137 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.  
Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-
CCT60-04: 
The claim by the applicants in Fourie of the right to get married should, in my view, be 
seen as part of a comprehensive wish to be able to live openly and freely as lesbian 
woman emancipated from all the legal taboos that historically have kept them from 
enjoying life in the mainstream of society.  The right to celebrate their union 
accordingly signifies far more than a right to enter into a legal arrangement with many 
attendant and significant consequences, important though they may be.  It represents a 
major symbolical milestone in their long walk to equality and dignity. 
Id. Immediately thereafter, the opinion acknowledges:  “The law … serves as a great teacher [and] 
establishes public norms . . . .”  Id. at para. 138. 
 193. Bala, supra note 4, at 26–27 (footnotes omitted). 
 194. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 17  (“In the context of marriage, we are telling people in a 
way that almost no other institution tells people, that we mean business about the absolute 
equality of human beings in this society.”); Wise & Stanley, supra note 73, at 335 (“This position 
01__STEWART.DOC 11/1/2007  3:33:44 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 73 ? 
That silence almost certainly results from calculation by 
genderless marriage proponents that what is publicly talked about—
governmental benefits pertaining to marriage status, emotional 
benefits, protections for the children in homes headed by same-sex 
couples—is more politically (in the broadest sense of the word) 
effective.  And this calculation works with a further calculation—that 
it is politically unwise to acknowledge the social institutional realities 
implicated by redefinition exactly because those realities shine the 
light on a price tag, indeed write that price tag.  That price tag, of 
course, is the value of man/woman marriage’s social goods inevitably 
lost when that institution is replaced with the new institution of 
genderless marriage.  That new institution’s meanings may or may 
not produce valuable social goods, but it plainly cannot produce 
those valuable goods resulting from the man/woman meaning 
constitutive of the old institution. 
These understandings lead to my initial criticism of the “overt 
social engineering” argument, that it is incomplete.  So far, it 
provides no answer to two questions raised by what it does provide.  
The first question is this: Why should we conclude that a rigorous 
valuation of the promised gains and the certain losses will show a net 
gain to society generally?  The second: To what extent, if any, is that 
valuation, that cost-benefit analysis, rightly a job for judges? 
That first question brings me back to Barbara and Klara.  The 
1918 Soviet constitution replaced the old private property institution 
with a new property institution.  That exchange undoubtedly made 
 
[of genderless marriage advocates] acknowledges the key, foundational properties of marriage as a 
social institution, for this is precisely why it is thought it will lead to social equality.”); Graff, supra 
note 53, at 12 (“Marriage is an institution that towers on our social horizon, defining how we 
think about one another . . . . If same-sex marriage becomes legal, that venerable institution will 
ever after stand for sexual choice . . . .”); cf. Cott, supra note 105, at 90 (the law’s power over the  
marriage institution ought to be used “to serve more egalitarian social goals than those served in 
the past—goals attuned to the actual diversity of society in the United States”). 
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for, in certain respects, a more equal society. But with its eye on the 
whole of human experience, history has judged that exchange a very 
bad one indeed.  So the first question is crucial, and to date no one 
has made a careful, transparent valuation of man/woman marriage’s 
unique social goods sure to be lost and genderless marriage’s 
necessarily speculative benefits.  Those who have spoken somewhat 
openly about using the institution of marriage for non-marriage ends 
speak almost exclusively of genderless marriage’s benefits to the gay 
and lesbian community and thus say virtually nothing about the 
consequences to society generally, apparently out of a lack of interest 
in that subject or on the basis of an unstated assumption that what is 
good for the gay and lesbian community is good for society generally.  
Yet absent a credible society-wide valuation of the losses and gains to 
result from the proposed institutional exchange, the case for that 
exchange must remain materially deficient. 
The second question—should judges be in the business either of 
creating their own or evaluating someone else’s valuation of the 
losses and gains to result from the proposed institutional exchange—
quite clearly ought to be answered “no.”  Even the judges mandating 
genderless marriage in Goodridge, Halpern, and EGALE did not 
claim a competence to engage in such a task; they reached their 
holding by denying the possibility of any losses, any downside, from 
their replacement of the old institution with the new, a denial clearly 
false.  Once social institutional realities are given their due, and 
consequently once the judicial task can no longer be characterized 
with any credibility as discarding a legal definition of marriage with 
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no rational basis,195 the fact-finding and constitutional competence of 
judges to engage the real task must be seriously doubted.196 
The “overt social engineering” argument has other defects.  It is 
plagued by a very considerable circularity in its notion of using the 
marriage institution to make ours a more just and equal society.  The 
notion proceeds from the assumed or implied premise that of course 
man/woman marriage violates equality norms and that genderless 
marriage will make ours a more just society.  From this beginning, it 
is not difficult to move to the conclusion that man/woman marriage 
violates equality norms and that genderless marriage will make ours a 
more just society.  But it should go without saying that what the 
important discourse is all about is the meaning of equality in the 
context of marriage, particularly its social institutional realities.  The 
debate to date strongly suggests that the equality argument for 
genderless marriage can succeed only if one ignores those realities 
and, even more, only if one replaces the full institutional 
understanding of man/woman marriage with the impoverished 
“close personal relationship model.”  That model is of a “pure 
relationship,” that is, a relationship stripped of any goal or end 
beyond the intrinsic, emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction 
that the relationship brings to the two adult individuals involved.197  
Judicial rejection of that model because it inadequately describes 
what marriage “is” results in judicial rejection of the equality 
 
 195. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961; Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY 
Slip Op 09436 at *37–38 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Saxe, J.P., dissenting), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm. 
 196. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The practice of 
deferring to rationally based legislative judgments . . . reflects our respect for the institutional 
competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our 
appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with 
matters open to a wide range of possible choices.”). 
 197. Cere, supra note 10, at 12–20; Stewart, supra note 6, at 95–96. 
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argument for genderless marriage.198  Judicial acceptance of that 
model’s accuracy and adequacy is the foundation for judicial 
acceptance of that equality argument,199 but to date judicial 
acceptance of the close personal relationship model has been an 
unexamined and unproven starting point of analysis, not the result of 
thoughtful examination.  This obvious feature of cases such as 
Halpern and Goodridge has led Douglas Farrow to label, and fairly so, 
their approach as “obviously circular, and viciously so.”200 
 
 198. See Lewis, 875 A.2d at 275–76 (J. Parrillo, concurring) (arguing that the close personal 
relationship model improperly ignores the full gamut of what man/woman marriage is about). 
 199. Stewart, supra note 6, at 97 (“Language in [EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge] suggests … 
that the courts deciding those case have consciously accepted the arguments of the close personal 
relationship theorists.”).  See Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436 
(N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ 
reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm, where the majority, in rejecting a state constitutional 
claim to genderless marriage, refused to adopt the close personal relationship model of marriage, 
which “treats all intimate and dependent relations as equal,” id. at *9, while the dissent 
unequivocally adopted that model, albeit with no justification other than the bare assertion that 
such now constitutes a “widely held view” of marriage. Id. at  *30. 
 200. Farrow, supra note 129, at  98–99: 
To proceed at all, we need to notice that the main rights argument [equality] amounts 
to a nice piece of subterfuge.  Its conclusion is that marriage must be redefined.  This 
distracts us from the fact that marriage has already been redefined in the argument’s 
very first move.  That is, a new category—the “close personal adult relationship”—has 
been invented to provide a framework for our understanding of marriage.  Once this 
framework is accepted, it follows that homosexual unions can be marriage-like and, in 
that case, should qualify as marriage.  If marriage is nothing but a certain form of 
publicly acknowledged sexual intimacy and commitment between two persons, one to 
which gender and biology and procreation are not directly relevant, why should the two 
persons not be of the same sex?  Would we not be discriminating against such persons 
by denying to their relationship the name and benefits of marriage?  And what requires 
such a denial?  Merely the common-law definition of marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman.  So let us change the definition and write into law that marriage is a close 
personal relationship between adults, a union of two persons.  That will erase the 
discrimination and resolve the equality-rights violation.  Marriage will be open to 
homosexuals. 
This argument is obviously circular, and viciously so.  Certainly there can be 
nothing wrong with saying that, if marriage is simply a union of two persons, two 
persons of the same sex must not be denied a marriage licence.  Nor is it necessarily 
wrong (though it may be foolish) to write into law that marriage is, or rather will be, 
simply a union of two persons.  It is wrong, however, to claim that we must write this 
new definition into law in order to avoid unconstitutional discrimination and equality-
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Further, the equality argument for genderless marriage has not 
yet come to grips with other social institutional realities, particularly 
the understandings that same-sex couples simply cannot enter the 
privileged marriage institution we have always known and that the 
sought for “marriage equality” can be achieved only by creating a 
radically new institution into which already married men and 
women are pulled and into which all couples seeking marriage in the 
future will enter.  These understandings necessarily lead to reflection 
on some basic ideals of equality jurisprudence, treating similarly 
situated people similarly and not treating dissimilarly situated people 
as the same.201  The simple fact is that, relative to the valued marriage 
institution received to date, man/woman couples and same-sex 
couples are not similarly situated.  And this is not a matter of “legal 
definitional preclusion.”  Rather, this is a matter of the very nature 
and purposes of this social institution.  That nature and those 
purposes are clearly not the result of any anti-gay/lesbian animus202 
 
rights violations, when in fact no such discrimination or violation is possible until after 
the new definition is in place. 
 201. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (ruling that a class of one 
treated differently from others similarly situated can be discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (the Equal 
Protection Clause is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike"); ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACEA 1113a–13b Book V3 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon 
Press 1925) ("[T]hings that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should 
be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness."); cf. Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at paras. 4–21.  Regarding Andrews’s conception that Charter 
equality “entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are 
recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration,” 
Andrews, 1 S.C.R. 143, at para. 16, and the application of that conception to genderless marriage 
claims, see Stewart, supra note 6, at 102–15. 
 202. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (“Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to discriminate 
against women or lesbians and gay men, as racial segregation was designed to maintain the 
pernicious doctrine of white supremacy.”); compare Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 
2005 NY Slip Op 09436, at *19 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Catterson, J., concurring), available 
at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm (“Plaintiffs have not 
alleged, much less proved, that the legislators who enacted the New York statutes related to 
marriage were motivated by” an “anti-homosexual animus.”), with id. at *34 (Saxe, J.P., 
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but have their own practical logic and effectiveness.  In this light, 
those making the equality argument for genderless marriage simply 
have not made their case at the most fundamental level of equality 
jurisprudence.  In this light, the equality argument for genderless 
marriage shows itself as nothing more than a demand that the law 
eliminate a vital social institution—an ancient institution of 
betterment and one fashioned from the beginning with no relevant 
animus, an institution that provides social goods crucially important 
to society—so that those dissimilarly situated relative to that 
institution will be leveled. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
To not blink at the social institutional realities is to realize, with 
understandable regret, that there can be no “win-win” outcome to 
the present marriage contest.  A society can sustain and nurture 
man/woman marriage but only by declining genderless marriage.  Or 
a society can sustain and nurture genderless marriage but only by 
causing, through force of law, the demise of the old institution.  Each 
society must choose.  And a choice as portentous as this choice may 
never come before us again. 203 
 
dissenting) (“The discriminatory impetus for the distinction made by the [marriage] statutes . . . 
was implicit.”). 
 203. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 18.  “The work we do today, and the issues we raise in this 
debate are among the most profound that this country has ever discussed and among the most 
import the country now faces.” Id. 
